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Depositors' Priority Over Senior Unsecured Bondholders: A Clog in the Bank Resolution Process?

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2560321
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.03.043openalex-extracted
How do asset encumbrance and debt regulations affect bank capital and bond risk?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2013.02.002openalex-extracted
Do we need big banks? Evidence on performance, strategy and market discipline
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2011.12.002openalex-extracted
Bank Resolution Plans as a catalyst for global financial reform
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2013.07.004openalex-extracted
Minimum capital requirements, bank supervision and special resolution schemes. Consequences for bank risk-taking
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2014.04.001openalex-extracted
Anatomy of a bail-in
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0014-2921(01)00150-7openalex-extracted
Financial opening, deposit insurance, and risk in a model of banking competition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0378-4266(99)00028-xopenalex-extracted
Building an incentive-compatible safety net
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230289147_6openalex-extracted
Post-Resolution Treatment of Depositors at Failed Banks: Implications for the Severity of Banking Crises, Systemic Risk, and Too-Big-To-Fail
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/14735970.2009.11421535openalex-extracted
Bank Resolution Regimes: Balancing Prudential Regulation and Shareholder Rights
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199671342.001.0001openalex-extracted
Principles of Corporate Finance Law
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/law/9780198754411.003.0003openalex-extracted
The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199242948.003.0003openalex-extracted
The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/13.3.813openalex-extracted
Bankruptcy Priority for Bank Deposits: A Contract Theoretic Explanation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rft057openalex-extracted
Depositors’ Perception of “Too-Big-to-Fail”
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/ww/9780199540884.013.u15839openalex-extracted
Fitchew, Geoffrey Edward, (22 Dec. 1939–20 April 2011), Chairman, Insolvency Practices Council, since 2005
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1108/jfep-07-2013-0030openalex-extracted
Living wills and cross-border resolution of systemically important banks
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1108/jfrc-07-2013-0022openalex-extracted
Bank resolution costs, depositor preference and asset encumbrance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/jacf.12015openalex-extracted
How to Design a Contingent Convertible Debt Requirement That Helps Solve Our Too‐Big‐to‐Fail Problem*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/yrev.12234openalex-extracted
PASSION PLAY
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004163300.i-1081.238openalex-extracted
Basel Committee On Banking Supervision
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1177/002795016202000103openalex-extracted
Errata: National Institute Economic Review, no. 19, February 1962
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/000282802320191886openalex-extracted
Report of the Finance Committee
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110272512openalex-extracted
Too Big To Fail - Brauchen wir ein Sonderinsolvenzrecht für Banken?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110272512.105openalex-extracted
Triggers for Bank Resolution
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110272512.159openalex-extracted
The Regulatory Responses to Bank Insolvencies in Germany and the United States – An Evaluation of the German KredReorgG and the U.S. FDICA Insolvency Regime from a Restructuring Perspective
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110272512.35openalex-extracted
The Problem of Bank Resolution Remains Unsolved: A Critique of the German Bank Restructuring Law
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110272512.63openalex-extracted
Resolution Requires Reform
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110321401.189openalex-extracted
Legal Problems of Bail-ins under the EU’s proposed Recovery and Resolution Directive
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.15496/publikation-13437openalex-extracted
Resolution: concepts, requirements and tools
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-6577openalex-extracted
Financial Inclusion for Financial Stability: Access to Bank Deposits and the Growth of Deposits in the Global Financial Crisis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1427830openalex-extracted
Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch and Systemic Bailouts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1447913openalex-extracted
The UK Special Resolution Regime for Failing Banks in an International Context
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2105714openalex-extracted
Market Discipline During Crisis: Evidence from Bank Depositors in Transition Countries
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2136084openalex-extracted
Bank Resolution Regimes in Europe II – Resolution Tools and Powers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2136101openalex-extracted
Bank Resolution Regimes in Europe I – Recovery and Resolution Planning, Early Intervention
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2336872openalex-extracted
Special Resolution Regimes for Banking Institutions: Objectives and Limitations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2353035openalex-extracted
OLA after Single Point of Entry: Has Anything Changed?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2361347openalex-extracted
Bank Resolution in the European Banking Union: A Transatlantic Perspective on What it Would Take
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2478647openalex-extracted
A Critical Evaluation of Bail-Ins as Bank Recapitalisation Mechanisms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2499613openalex-extracted
Resolution: Concepts, Requirements and Tools
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.378841openalex-extracted
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/20031858openalex-extracted
Global Governance of Financial Systems: The International Regulation of Systemic Risk
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/792240openalex-extracted
Handbook of American Constitutional Law
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/795626openalex-extracted
Secured Financing and Priorities among Creditors
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt207g8bt.22openalex-extracted
Ibid.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w15138openalex-extracted
Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch and Systemic Bailouts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203418475-9openalex-extracted
The role of banks
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4337/9781782548942.00008openalex-extracted
Table of EU/EC/EEC legislation (in chronological order)
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4337/9781783479177.00007openalex-extracted
The bank funding model
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451850543.001openalex-extracted
Post-Resolution Treatment of Depositors At Failed Banks
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5089/9781475503906.006openalex-extracted
From Bail-out to Bail-in
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5089/9781484354100.001openalex-extracted
Bank Resolution Costs, Depositor Preference, and Asset Encumbrance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5235/175214412799195256openalex-extracted
The great British banking experiment: will the restructuring of UK banking show us how to resolve G-SIFIs?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.7916/d8th8x53openalex-extracted
The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/cep/byh017openalex-snapshot
Depositor Liquidity and Loss Sharing in Bank Failure Resolutions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1433502openalex-snapshot
Why Did Some Banks Perform Better during the Credit Crisis? A Cross-Country Study of the Impact of Governance and Regulation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1578668openalex-snapshot
Crisis Management and Resolution for a European Banking System
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