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https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2706011

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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02874642openalex-extracted
Optimization for products of concave functions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.01.003openalex-extracted
Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.12.004openalex-extracted
Moral hazard with bounded payments
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2004.08.002openalex-extracted
Existence and monotonicity of solutions to moral hazard problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24openalex-extracted
Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2009.00559.xopenalex-extracted
Strategic Communication with Lying Costs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.42.1.151openalex-extracted
A Note on Strategic Sampling in Agencies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911363openalex-extracted
Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1912246openalex-extracted
An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1913238openalex-extracted
Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2297481openalex-extracted
Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2297639openalex-extracted
Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555518openalex-extracted
Regulation, Asymmetric Information, and Auditing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3003320openalex-extracted
Moral Hazard and Observability
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta6688openalex-extracted
Two New Conditions Supporting the First-Order Approach to Multisignal Principal-Agent Problems
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