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https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2780499

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inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1029openalex-extracted
Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2000.0830openalex-extracted
Evolution of Communication with Partial Common Interest
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0855openalex-extracted
How Communication Improves Efficiency in Bargaining Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2359openalex-extracted
A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2914openalex-extracted
Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01211783openalex-extracted
An experimental study of strategic information transmission
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9159-4openalex-extracted
z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-013-9362-zopenalex-extracted
For those about to talk we salute you: an experimental study of credible deviations and ACDC
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-013-9376-6openalex-extracted
Communication & competition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90125-7openalex-extracted
Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90055-oopenalex-extracted
Communication between rational agents
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90040-bopenalex-extracted
Refining cheap-talk equilibria
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.02.009openalex-extracted
Bare promises: An experiment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.04.001openalex-extracted
Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.008openalex-extracted
Equilibrium refinement vs. level-k analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.011openalex-extracted
Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.02.010openalex-extracted
The aversion to lying
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-2681(02)00092-6openalex-extracted
Cheap talk in bargaining experiments: lying and threats in ultimatum games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511609381.002openalex-extracted
The market for “lemons”: quality uncertainty and the market mechanism
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/256654openalex-extracted
An Experimental Imperfect Market
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/258609openalex-extracted
An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/260231openalex-extracted
Advertising as Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/revfin/12.3.0481openalex-extracted
Cheap Talk, Fraud, and Adverse Selection in Financial Markets: Some Experimental Evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/3.3.315openalex-extracted
Pooling, Separating, and Semiseparating Equilibria in Financial Markets: Some Experimental Evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0012-9682.2008.00819.xopenalex-extracted
Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00719.xopenalex-extracted
Promises and Partnership
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00735.xopenalex-extracted
Dynamic Matching, Two-Sided Incomplete Information, and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect Competition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2004.00214.xopenalex-extracted
Promises, Threats and Fairness
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02205.xopenalex-extracted
Deception Through Telling the Truth?! Experimental Evidence from Individuals and Teams
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00186.xopenalex-extracted
Endogenous market segmentation for lemons
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828053828662openalex-extracted
Deception: The Role of Consequences
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.3.984openalex-extracted
Pinocchio's Pupil: Using Eyetracking and Pupil Dilation to Understand Truth Telling and Deception in Sender-Receiver Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.4.1325openalex-extracted
The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1110.1449openalex-extracted
White Lies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691213255-007openalex-extracted
5. Industrial Organization: A Survey of Laboratory Research
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1533/9780857099341.226openalex-extracted
Appendix
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.119748openalex-extracted
Cheap Talk, Fraud and Adverse Selection in Financial Markets: Some Experimental Evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1868266openalex-extracted
Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Games: A General Approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2324057openalex-extracted
The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.380083openalex-extracted
Promises and Partnership
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1879431openalex-extracted
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911195openalex-extracted
Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1912657openalex-extracted
Product Quality Signaling in Experimental Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1912767openalex-extracted
Sequential Equilibria
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1913390openalex-extracted
Strategic Information Transmission
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2297896openalex-extracted
Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2937956openalex-extracted
Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta12103openalex-extracted
Efficient Competition Through Cheap Talk: The Case of Competing Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta7673openalex-extracted
Why Do People Keep Their Promises? An Experimental Test of Two Explanations
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