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Takeover Defenses in the Era of Shareholder Activism
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What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-023-09767-8openalex-extracted
Activist directors: determinants and consequences
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(86)90008-xopenalex-extracted
Predicting takeover targets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(88)90051-7openalex-extracted
The effect of poison pill securities on shareholder wealth
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(94)00823-jopenalex-extracted
Poison or placebo? Evidence on the deterrence and wealth effects of modern antitakeover measures
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(94)90038-8openalex-extracted
Outside directors and the adoption of poison pills
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0378-4266(95)00051-8openalex-extracted
Takeover defenses and wealth effects on securityholders: The case of poison pill adoptions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.02.002openalex-extracted
Investors׳ reaction to the use of poison pills as a tax loss preservation tool
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.12.006openalex-extracted
The costs of entrenched boards
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.01.005openalex-extracted
Classified boards, firm value, and managerial entrenchment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.05.005openalex-extracted
Investor activism and takeovers☆
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.09.007openalex-extracted
The Costs of Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Sequential Decision Model
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.08.005openalex-extracted
How do staggered boards affect shareholder value? Evidence from a natural experiment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhn099openalex-extracted
What Matters in Corporate Governance?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhp024openalex-extracted
Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United States
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00851.xopenalex-extracted
Does Weak Governance Cause Weak Stock Returns? An Examination of Firm Operating Performance and Investors' Expectations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01259.xopenalex-extracted
Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01373.xopenalex-extracted
Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01432.xopenalex-extracted
Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12138openalex-extracted
Thirty Years of Shareholder Rights and Firm Value
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-110613-034455openalex-extracted
Blockholders and Corporate Governance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-111914-041751openalex-extracted
Recent Advances in Research on Hedge Fund Activism: Value Creation and Identification
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/00335530360535162openalex-extracted
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1003792openalex-extracted
Investor Activism and Takeovers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1413133openalex-extracted
Thirty Years of Shareholder Rights and Firm Valuation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2285781openalex-extracted
Blockholders and Corporate Governance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2496518openalex-extracted
The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism: Evidence and Implications
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2517594openalex-extracted
The Law and Finance of Anti-Takeover Statutes
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2608759openalex-extracted
Do Takeover Defenses Deter Takeovers?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.631344openalex-extracted
The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.697501openalex-extracted
Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.913362openalex-extracted
Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.919300openalex-extracted
Hedge Funds Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w4316openalex-extracted
Poison or Placebo? Evidence on the Deterrent and Wealth Effects of Modern Antitakeover Measures
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00819.xopenalex-snapshot
Governance Mechanisms and Equity Prices
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2836463openalex-extracted
Can Staggered Boards Improve Value? Evidence from the Massachusetts Natural Experiment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12709openalex-snapshot
Can Staggered Boards Improve Value? Causal Evidence from Massachusetts*
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