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Divide the Dollar and Conquer More: Sequential Bargaining and Risk Aversion

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Multi-issue Bargaining with Endogenous Agenda
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Risk aversion in bargaining: An experimental study
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Risk aversion and the relationship between Nash's solution and subgame perfect equilibrium of sequential bargaining
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Absolute and relative risk aversion: An experimental study
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Strategic step-by-step negotiation
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A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium
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Concavifiability and constructions of concave utility functions
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The importance of the agenda in bargaining
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THE DEMAND FOR RISKY ASSETS
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Generalized Raiffa solutions
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Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: The extended Kalai–Smorodinsky solution
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Nash bargaining and risk aversion
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First things first? The agenda formation problem for multi-issue committees
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Delays and partial agreements in multi-issue bargaining
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A theorist's view of experiments
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Optimizing multi-stage negotiations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-2681(03)00087-8openalex-extracted
Agenda restrictions in multi-issue bargaining
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00019-2openalex-extracted
On risk aversion and bargaining outcomes
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Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/0003684042000280580openalex-extracted
On the measurement of risk aversion from experimental data
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Bargaining Piecemeal Or All At Once?
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21. Arbitration Schemes for Generalized Two-person Games
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Delays and Partial Agreements in Multi-Issue Bargaining
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Bargaining and Markets
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The Bargaining Problem
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A Note on Risk Aversion in a Perfect Equilibrium Model of Bargaining
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Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
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Risk Aversion and Nash's Solution for Bargaining Games with Risky Outcomes
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Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large
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Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
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Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
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Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
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Bargaining in Legislatures
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Aspects of the Theory of Risk-Bearing.
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The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling
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Bargaining with an agenda
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