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Misreporting and Compensation Under Incomplete Commitment
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(93)90017-aopenalex-extracted
Stock-based incentive compensation and investment behavior
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.12.003openalex-extracted
The impact of performance-based compensation on misreporting
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.05.007openalex-extracted
An equilibrium model of incentive contracts in the presence of information manipulation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.06.003openalex-extracted
Stock option vesting conditions, CEO turnover, and myopic investment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2014.939372openalex-extracted
Does corporate governance quality affect analyst coverage? Evidence from the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahq026openalex-extracted
Vicarious Liability for Bad Corporate Governance: Are We Wrong about 10b-5?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-036x.2009.00500.xopenalex-extracted
Is CEO Pay Really Inefficient? A Survey of New Optimal Contracting Theories
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00674.xopenalex-extracted
Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00890.xopenalex-extracted
CEOs' Outside Employment Opportunities and the Lack of Relative Performance Evaluation in Compensation Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6622.1990.tb00207.xopenalex-extracted
CEO INCENTIVES — IT'S NOT HOW MUCH YOU PAY, BUT HOW*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1163/1570-6664_iyb_sim_person_39944openalex-extracted
Geithner, Timothy Franz
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/1565-3404.1307openalex-extracted
Hidden Costs of Mandatory Long-Term Compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1108765openalex-extracted
The Temporal Structure of Equity Compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.124508openalex-extracted
The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1362599openalex-extracted
Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.146148openalex-extracted
CEO Incentives: It's Not How Much You Pay, But How
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1535355openalex-extracted
Paying for Long-Term Performance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1962834openalex-extracted
The Optimal Timing of CEO Compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2055827openalex-extracted
Executive Equity Mix, Earnings Manipulation, and Project Continuation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.893833openalex-extracted
Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and its Implementation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1598033openalex-extracted
Judicial Innovations in the New York Arbitration Law
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1600632openalex-extracted
Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/t0095openalex-extracted
The Effect of Insider Trading on Insiders' Reaction to Opportunities to "Waste" Corporate Value
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.42-4735openalex-extracted
Pay without performance: the unfulfilled promise of executive compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.51-3957openalex-extracted
Talent wants to be free: why we should learn to love leaks, raids, and free riding
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00051-9openalex-snapshot
On the optimality of resetting executive stock options
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01768.xopenalex-snapshot
Dynamic CEO Compensation
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