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Technological Improvement and the Decentralizatiton Penalty in a Simple Principal/Agent Model

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2945702
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04645-2_11openalex-extracted
Free-Riding and Free-Labor in Combinatorial Agency
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7957-5_16openalex-extracted
An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-008-0065-4openalex-extracted
Inefficiency and complementarity in sharing games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.02.024openalex-extracted
Quantifying the social welfare loss in moral hazard models
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.008openalex-extracted
Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s1574-0145(06)01004-xopenalex-extracted
Chapter 4 Organization Structure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511800481openalex-extracted
Algorithmic Game Theory
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139060011.012openalex-extracted
Organizational Economics with Cognitive Costs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781316779309.012openalex-extracted
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230236721_41openalex-extracted
We Cannot Have Discipline So We Must Have Pain
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400829453openalex-extracted
The Theory of Incentives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.21236/ada637949openalex-extracted
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1912246openalex-extracted
An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3003320openalex-extracted
Moral Hazard and Observability
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3003457openalex-snapshot
Moral Hazard in Teams
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