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Optimal Ex Post Risk Adjustment in Markets with Adverse Selection
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.1614openalex-extracted
Optimal cost reimbursement of health insurers to reduce risk selection
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00133751openalex-extracted
Adverse selection and Pareto improvements through compulsory insurance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00140019openalex-extracted
Incentives for cost reduction under price cap regulation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-018-1101-4openalex-extracted
Contract withdrawals and equilibrium in competitive markets with adverse selection
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(87)90046-8openalex-extracted
Some recent developments in the theory of competition in markets with adverse selection ∗
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(95)00049-6openalex-extracted
Non-discriminating renegotiation in a competitive insurance market
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(77)90004-7openalex-extracted
A model of insurance markets with incomplete information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(78)90055-5openalex-extracted
Product differentiation and performance in insurance markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(85)90005-2openalex-extracted
The efficiency of competitive equilibria in insurance markets with asymmetric information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.12.030openalex-extracted
Nash equilibrium in competitive insurance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.04.007openalex-extracted
(Neutrally) Optimal Mechanism under Adverse Selection: The canonical insurance problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2006.01.005openalex-extracted
Optimal risk adjustment with adverse selection and spatial competition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.01.001openalex-extracted
On signalling and screening in markets with asymmetric information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-6296(02)00005-xopenalex-extracted
Cost-minimizing risk adjustment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-6296(02)00119-4openalex-extracted
Cream-skimming, incentives for efficiency and payment system
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-6296(96)00488-2openalex-extracted
Adverse selection and regulation in health insurance markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s1574-0064(00)80173-0openalex-extracted
Chapter 14 Risk adjustment in competitive health plan markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1057/grir.2014.9openalex-extracted
Participating Insurance Contracts and the Rothschild-Stiglitz Equilibrium Puzzle
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261392openalex-extracted
Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/503754openalex-extracted
Efficient Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/700730openalex-extracted
Screening and Adverse Selection in Frictional Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjw007openalex-extracted
Product Design in Selection Markets *
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12054openalex-extracted
A GAME THEORETIC FOUNDATION OF COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA WITH ADVERSE SELECTION
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12184openalex-extracted
INCENTIVE EFFICIENT PRICE SYSTEMS IN LARGE INSURANCE ECONOMIES WITH ADVERSE SELECTION
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00057.xopenalex-extracted
Asymmetric information in insurance: general testable implications
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12243openalex-extracted
Equilibrium in Insurance Markets With Adverse Selection When Insurers Pay Policy Dividends
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2010.125.3.877openalex-extracted
Estimating Welfare in Insurance Markets Using Variation in Prices *
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00661openalex-extracted
Imperfect Competition in Selection Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.90.4.1055openalex-extracted
Optimal Risk Adjustment in Markets with Adverse Selection: An Application to Managed Care
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1879431openalex-extracted
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1881793openalex-extracted
Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1885326openalex-extracted
Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911459openalex-extracted
Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1913244openalex-extracted
Market Equilibrium with Hidden Knowledge and Self-Selection
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3003294openalex-extracted
The Rat Race and Internal Labor Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta13434openalex-extracted
Perfect Competition in Markets With Adverse Selection
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