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Explaining Downward-Rigid CEO Compensation: An Information Asymmetry Perspective

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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.08.006openalex-extracted

Growth through rigidity: An explanation for the rise in CEO pay

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12054openalex-extracted

Subjective evaluations with performance feedback

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00486.xopenalex-extracted

A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01610.xopenalex-extracted

Why Are CEOs Rarely Fired? Evidence from Structural Estimation

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01688.xopenalex-extracted

Motivating Innovation

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12004openalex-extracted

Monitoring Managers: Does It Matter?

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-120209-133958openalex-extracted

CEO Compensation

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1070.0785openalex-extracted

Managerial Expertise, Private Information, and Pay-Performance Sensitivity

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.984376openalex-extracted

Managerial Capital and the Market for CEOs

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1884685openalex-extracted

The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1885060openalex-extracted

Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911724openalex-extracted

Repeated Moral Hazard

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1912116openalex-extracted

Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2118358openalex-extracted

Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2951674openalex-extracted

The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w11907openalex-extracted

Executive Pensions

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfu014openalex-snapshot

Performance Terms in CEO Compensation Contracts

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