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Formation of Collective Decision-Making Units: Stability and a Solution

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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1993.1035openalex-extracted
Stable Coalition Structures with a Unidimensional Set of Alternatives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20181-5_7openalex-extracted
Cooperative Equilibrium
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00123744openalex-extracted
Representative voter theorems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01376281openalex-extracted
Order restricted preferences and majority rule
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01766876openalex-extracted
Cooperative games with coalition structures
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(77)90002-3openalex-extracted
Existence of an equilibrium with arbitrary tax schemes for financing local public goods
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(77)90086-2openalex-extracted
Existence of equilibria in economies with a local public good
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(79)90005-xopenalex-extracted
Competitive equilibrium with local public goods
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(79)90027-9openalex-extracted
Stability when mobility is restricted by the existing coalition structure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(81)90017-xopenalex-extracted
Second best taxation as a game
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(83)90107-2openalex-extracted
Existence of voting-market equilibria
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(86)90090-6openalex-extracted
Strong tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(74)90005-xopenalex-extracted
The demand for education in public and private school systems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(77)90005-6openalex-extracted
Voting over income tax schedules
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(84)90012-4openalex-extracted
Equilibrium among local jurisdictions: toward an integrated treatment of voting and residential choice
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(95)01503-5openalex-extracted
Majority voting with single-crossing preferences
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0094-1190(79)90034-2openalex-extracted
Market models of local government: Exit, voting, and the land market
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0166-0462(93)90037-fopenalex-extracted
Existence of voting and housing equilibrium in a system of communities with property taxes
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(94)90035-3openalex-extracted
Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s1574-0005(05)80065-7openalex-extracted
Chapter 33 Game theory and public economics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/257839openalex-extracted
A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261029openalex-extracted
The Implications of Competition Among Jurisdictions: Does Tiebout Need Politics?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261780openalex-extracted
Mobility and Redistribution
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1201/b18653-3openalex-extracted
Games and Decisions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911519openalex-extracted
A Critique of Tiebout's Theory of Local Public Expenditures
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1912943openalex-extracted
Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1913903openalex-extracted
Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2951479openalex-extracted
Monotone Comparative Statics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2982303openalex-extracted
Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.14228openalex-extracted
Positive Political Theory I

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00267.xopenalex-snapshot
An Algorithm for Stable and Equitable Coalition Structures with Public Goods
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3081612openalex-snapshot
An Algorithm for Stable and Equitable Coalition Structures with Public Goods
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