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https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3156442

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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2000.0830openalex-extracted
Evolution of Communication with Partial Common Interest
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0892openalex-extracted
Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words? An Experimental Comparison of Observation and Cheap Talk
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2359openalex-extracted
A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0637-7openalex-extracted
Pre-communication in a coordination game with incomplete information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9159-4openalex-extracted
z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(91)90022-7openalex-extracted
Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(92)90044-sopenalex-extracted
A battle-of-the-sexes game with incomplete information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.04.001openalex-extracted
Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.004openalex-extracted
How cheap talk enhances efficiency in threshold public goods games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.12.009openalex-extracted
Cooperation through communication: Teams and individuals in finitely repeated Prisoners’ dilemma games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.03.001openalex-extracted
The effects of costless pre-play communication: Experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0278-0984(05)13003-xopenalex-extracted
Communication and Efficiency in Coordination Game Experiments
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_2142-1openalex-extracted
Coordination Problems and Communication
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/10463280701676543openalex-extracted
Explanations of interindividual – intergroup discontinuity: A review of the evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00719.xopenalex-extracted
Promises and Partnership
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002793037001005openalex-extracted
The Role of Communication in Interindividual-Intergroup Discontinuity
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828053828662openalex-extracted
Deception: The Role of Consequences
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.10.3.103openalex-extracted
Cheap Talk
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1789794openalex-extracted
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1913390openalex-extracted
Strategic Information Transmission
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2118488openalex-extracted
Communication in Coordination Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555533openalex-extracted
Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Entry
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555589openalex-extracted
Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555734openalex-extracted
Communication in the Battle of the Sexes Game: Some Experimental Results
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvcmxrzdopenalex-extracted
Game Theory for Applied Economists
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2514/5.9781600866166.0357.0368openalex-extracted
Economics of Strategic Planning

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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0637-7openalex-snapshot
Pre-communication in a coordination game with incomplete information
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