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Optimal Smart Contracts with Costly Verification

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3404171
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0openalex-extracted
Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(83)90048-0openalex-extracted
Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/bloc.2019.8751482openalex-extracted
Solving the Buyer and Seller’s Dilemma: A Dual-Deposit Escrow Smart Contract for Provably Cheat-Proof Delivery and Payment for a Digital Good without a Trusted Mediator
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/1374376.1374390openalex-extracted
Optimal mechanism design and money burning
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2600057.2602843openalex-extracted
Reallocation mechanisms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3243734.3243857openalex-extracted
FairSwap
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.12.3779openalex-extracted
Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v25i1.7890openalex-extracted
Incentive-Compatible Escrow Mechanisms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3093879openalex-extracted
Can Blockchain Solve the Holdup Problem in Contracts?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3334674openalex-extracted
The Governance of Blockchain Dispute Resolution
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2297737openalex-extracted
Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2937855openalex-extracted
Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta14991openalex-extracted
Mechanisms With Evidence: Commitment and Robustness
Editorial review for independent work. ICSAC — the Institute for Complexity Science and Advanced Computing — runs a structured editorial panel for researchers publishing outside journals, and publishes on CiteStamp rails. Submission is free and goes through ORCID: icsacinstitute.org/submit.