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https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3493768
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0693openalex-extracted
An Asymptotic Solution for Sealed Bid Common-Value Auctions with Bidders Having Asymmetric Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2600openalex-extracted
Can the Seller Benefit from an Insider in Common-Value Auctions?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820200108openalex-extracted
On the impact of low-balling: Experimental results in asymmetric auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-005-1407-5openalex-extracted
Learning Direction Theory and the Winner's Curse
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9159-4openalex-extracted
z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-010-9242-zopenalex-extracted
Bidder Asymmetry in Infrastructure Procurement: Are There any Fringe Bidders?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-011-9318-4openalex-extracted
Construction Procurement Auctions: Do Entrant Bidders Employ More Aggressive Strategies than Incumbent Bidders?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1996(89)90005-6openalex-extracted
Government procurement and international trade
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(82)90008-8openalex-extracted
The value of information in a sealed-bid auction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(83)90034-4openalex-extracted
Competitive bidding and proprietary information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.07.025openalex-extracted
Common value auctions with asymmetric bidder information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.013openalex-extracted
An experiment on first-price common-value auctions with asymmetric information structures: The blessed winner
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.01.001openalex-extracted
The value of an informed bidder in common value auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.01.003openalex-extracted
Small business set-asides in procurement auctions: An empirical analysis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(03)00098-3openalex-extracted
Asymmetric auction experiments with(out) commonly known beliefs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1061/(asce)0733-9364(2003)129:3(285)openalex-extracted
Evaluating and Comparing Bidding Optimization Effectiveness
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhj034openalex-extracted
Takeover Contests with Asymmetric Bidders
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6419.00083openalex-extracted
Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00074openalex-extracted
Common Value Auctions with Insider Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12158openalex-extracted
CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS AND INFORMATION REVELATION IN PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2006.01121.xopenalex-extracted
Asymmetry in Procurement Auctions: Evidence from Snow Removal Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00038.xopenalex-extracted
Buy‐out prices in auctions: seller competition and multi‐unit demands
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1937-5956.2012.01356.xopenalex-extracted
Increasing Revenue by Decreasing Information in Procurement Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.12576openalex-extracted
An Experimental Investigation of Procurement Auctions with Asymmetric Sellers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.13174openalex-extracted
To Thine Own Self Be True: Asymmetric Information in Procurement Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/00346530152480063openalex-extracted
Super-Experienced Bidders in First-Price Common-Value Auctions: Rules of Thumb, NASH Equilibrium Bidding, and the Winner's Curse
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.15.7.362openalex-extracted
A Model of Rational Competitive Bidding
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.42.10.1463openalex-extracted
Bidding in Common Value Auctions: How the Commercial Construction Industry Corrects for the Winner's Curse
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.49.1.71.12748openalex-extracted
Is Subsidizing Inefficient Bidders Actually Costly?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400830138.177openalex-extracted
5 Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400883172-010openalex-extracted
9. Auctions A Survey of Experimental Research
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-4660openalex-extracted
Bidder Asymmetry In Infrastructure Procurement: Are There Any Fringe Bidders?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2118/2993-paopenalex-extracted
Competitive Bidding in High-Risk Situations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2188openalex-extracted
First-Price Auctions When the Ranking of Valuations is Common Knowledge
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1913557openalex-extracted
Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2171804openalex-extracted
Econometrics of First-Price Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555645openalex-extracted
An Asymmetric Common-Value Auction Model
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3003578openalex-extracted
The Competitive Effect in Bonus Bidding: New Evidence
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