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Paying Extra for a Label? Evidence of Principal-Agent Problem in the Housing Market

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inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-007-9028-8openalex-extracted
The Impact of Dual Agency
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-012-9385-9openalex-extracted
Is Dual Agency in Real Estate a Cause for Concern?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-013-9416-1openalex-extracted
House Price Index Construction in the Nascent Housing Market: The Case of China
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(79)90073-5openalex-extracted
Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-444-59531-7.00013-2openalex-extracted
The Microstructure of Housing Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2015.08.026openalex-extracted
New methodology for constructing real estate price indices applied to the Singapore residential market
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.06.006openalex-extracted
Conflicts between principals and agents: evidence from residential brokerage
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhe.2020.101715openalex-extracted
House price index based on online listing information: The case of China
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104222openalex-extracted
Tax evasion, capital gains taxes, and the housing market
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511809477.012openalex-extracted
Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/10835547.2005.12091162openalex-extracted
Homeowners' Repeat-Sale Gains, Dual Agency and Repeated Use of the Same Agent
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjw029openalex-extracted
Stereotypes*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12163openalex-extracted
Understanding in‐house transactions in the real estate brokerage industry
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2012.00485.xopenalex-extracted
Agency Problems and Reputation in Expert Services: Evidence from Auto Repair
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6975.2006.00180.xopenalex-extracted
The Economics of Insurance Intermediaries
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01798.xopenalex-extracted
What Do Consumers’ Fund Flows Maximize? Evidence from Their Brokers’ Incentives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12048openalex-extracted
Mutual Fund Performance and the Incentive to Generate Alpha
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00625openalex-extracted
Understanding the Advice of Commissions-Motivated Agents: Evidence from the Indian Life Insurance Market
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00704openalex-extracted
The Economics of Attribute-Based Regulation: Theory and Evidence from Fuel Economy Standards
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/000282803322655392openalex-extracted
Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.2.780openalex-extracted
Competition through Commissions and Kickbacks
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.5.1878openalex-extracted
The Relative Performance of Real Estate Marketing Platforms: MLS versus FSBOMadison.com
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20160214openalex-extracted
Conflicts of Interest and Steering in Residential Brokerage
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.50.2.494openalex-extracted
Financial Advice
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1393289openalex-extracted
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1912246openalex-extracted
An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3003319openalex-extracted
Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3003320openalex-extracted
Moral Hazard and Observability
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w11053openalex-extracted
Market Distortions when Agents are Better Informed: The Value of Information in Real Estate Transactions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w17929openalex-extracted
The Market for Financial Advice: An Audit Study
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/rest.90.4.599openalex-snapshot
Market Distortions When Agents Are Better Informed: The Value of Information in Real Estate Transactions
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