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Collusive Incentives in Markets with Differentiated Products

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3576343
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Prisoners' Dilemma in Duopoly (Super)Games
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A Note on Price and Quantity Competition in Differentiated Oligopolies
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Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry
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Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergames
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Duopoly supergames with product differentiation
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Corrigenda
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Price vs. quantity competition in oligopoly supergames
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On the sustainability of collusion in differentiated duopolies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-7187(89)90025-8openalex-extracted
Collusion among asymmetric firms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-7187(95)00509-9openalex-extracted
Optimal symmetric punishments in a Bertrand differentiated products duopoly
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Iterated strict dominance in general games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.003openalex-extracted
Optimal collusion under imperfect monitoring in multimarket contact
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.04.012openalex-extracted
Cartel pricing dynamics with cost variability and endogenous buyer detection
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2008.01.004openalex-extracted
Delivered pricing and the impact of spatial differentiation on cartel stability
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.05.001openalex-extracted
Vertical integration and downstream collusion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0014-2921(87)80011-9openalex-extracted
A price-setting supergame between two heterogeneous firms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-2681(97)00025-5openalex-extracted
Collusive behavior with heterogeneous firms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-7187(97)00052-0openalex-extracted
Cartel stability when costs are heterogeneous
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781107707139openalex-extracted
Industrial Organization
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00360openalex-extracted
Existence and Uniqueness of Maximal Reductions Under Iterated Strict Dominance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5876.00214openalex-extracted
Non‐Negative Quantity Constraints and the Duration of Punishment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2008.00845.xopenalex-extracted
Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00091.xopenalex-extracted
Endogenous cartel formation with heterogeneous firms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00183.xopenalex-extracted
Colluding through suppliers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911077openalex-extracted
On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2296617openalex-extracted
A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555525openalex-extracted
Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555750openalex-extracted
Partial Collusion Fosters Minimum Product Differentiation
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A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Business Cycles and Price Wars During Booms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2997464openalex-snapshot
Collusive Vertical Relations
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Optimal Collusion with Private Information
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