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Extensive-Form Level-k Thinking
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What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1031openalex-extracted
On Players′ Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0033openalex-extracted
Strategic Rationality Orderings and the Best Rationalization Principle
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.2252openalex-extracted
On Rationalizability in Extensive Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2460openalex-extracted
Conditional Dominance, Rationalizability, and Game Forms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2942openalex-extracted
Strong Belief and Forward Induction Reasoning
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-68820-1_14openalex-extracted
How to make Sense of Game Theory
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(81)90018-1openalex-extracted
Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90276-1openalex-extracted
The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(94)90103-1openalex-extracted
Experimental evidence on players' models of other players
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.008openalex-extracted
Equilibrium refinement vs. level-k analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.002openalex-extracted
Beliefs and endogenous cognitive levels: An experimental study
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.008openalex-extracted
Belief in the opponentsʼ future rationality
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.05.002openalex-extracted
Comprehensive Rationalizability
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.01.007openalex-extracted
Non-equilibrium play in centipede games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.02.004openalex-extracted
Strategic Reasoning in Persuasion Games: An Experiment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2005.07.006openalex-extracted
Level-n bounded rationality in two-player two-stage games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2012.03.010openalex-extracted
Level-k analysis of experimental centipede games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.05.002openalex-extracted
Forward Induction: Thinking and Behavior
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105091openalex-extracted
Reasoning about others' reasoning
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105283openalex-extracted
Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105384openalex-extracted
Informed speculation with k-level reasoning
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105421openalex-extracted
Mechanism design with level-k types: Theory and an application to bilateral trade
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s1090-9443(02)00054-6openalex-extracted
Rationalizability in infinite, dynamic games with incomplete information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/688849openalex-extracted
Cognitive Ability, Character Skills, and Learning to Play Equilibrium: A Level- k Analysis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/geer.12099openalex-extracted
An Experiment on Forward vs. Backward Induction: How Fairness and Level k Reasoning Matter
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00810.xopenalex-extracted
Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2008.00835.xopenalex-extracted
Admissibility in Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/0033553041502225openalex-extracted
A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.7.3561openalex-extracted
The 11–20 Money Request Game: A Level-k Reasoning Study
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.51.1.5openalex-extracted
Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1120.1645openalex-extracted
A Dynamic Level-k Model in Sequential Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3595openalex-extracted
A Bayesian Level-k Model in n-Person Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2020-2013openalex-extracted
Prudent Rationalizability in Generalized Extensive-form Games with Unawareness
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00016066openalex-extracted
Political Awareness, Microtargeting of Voters, and Negative Electoral Campaigning
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.145793openalex-extracted
Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2448144openalex-extracted
Cognitive Ability, Character Skills, and Learning to Play Equilibrium: A Level-k Analysis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4063634openalex-extracted
On the Sophistication of Financial Investors and the Information Revealed by Prices
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4205290openalex-extracted
Conditional Dominance in Games With Unawareness
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2202/1534-5963.1073openalex-extracted
Rationalization and Incomplete Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911197openalex-extracted
Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1912320openalex-extracted
On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1913562openalex-extracted
Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2951552openalex-extracted
Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2951586openalex-extracted
Backward Induction, Normal Form Perfection and Explicable Equilibria
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta11983openalex-extracted
Identifying Higher-Order Rationality
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00239openalex-snapshot
Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study
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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.02.004openalex-snapshot
Strategic Reasoning in Persuasion Games: An Experiment
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