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https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4216866
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
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Controlled Markov Processes and Viscosity Solutions
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Brownian Motion and Stochastic Calculus
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Continuous-time Stochastic Control and Optimization with Financial Applications
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Stochastic Differential Equations
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Risk vs. profit potential: A model for corporate strategy
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Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.03.015openalex-extracted
On the smoothness of value functions and the existence of optimal strategies in diffusion models
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.08.003openalex-extracted
Optimal Dynamic Contracts with Moral Hazard and Costly Monitoring
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.07.010openalex-extracted
Capital immobility and the reach for yield
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2003.08.005openalex-extracted
Capital requirements, market power, and risk-taking in banking
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2010.11.001openalex-extracted
Liquidity management and corporate demand for hedging and insurance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2003.07.004openalex-extracted
Banking market structure and financial stability: Evidence from the Texas real estate crisis in the 1980s
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.01.005openalex-extracted
A model of dynamic compensation and capital structure☆
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.05.004openalex-extracted
The economics of hedge funds
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Playing it safe? Managerial preferences, risk, and agency conflicts
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Dynamic resource allocation with hidden volatility
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De-leveraging or de-risking? How banks cope with loss
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(01)00044-7openalex-extracted
The theory and practice of corporate finance: evidence from the field
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022109014000301openalex-extracted
Managerial Incentives, Risk Aversion, and Debt
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022109019000826openalex-extracted
Dynamic Moral Hazard and Risk-Shifting Incentives in a Leveraged Firm
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1070/rm1995v050n02abeh002054openalex-extracted
Optimization of the flow of dividends
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/13518470701198734openalex-extracted
Determinants of Leverage and Agency Problems: A Regression Approach with Survey Data
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Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets
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An EBIT‐Based Model of Dynamic Capital Structure
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Incentives and Performance with Optimal Money Management Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfw006openalex-extracted
An Experimental Analysis of Risk-Shifting Behavior
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/5.3.437openalex-extracted
Managerial Conservatism, Project Choice, and Debt
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhm023openalex-extracted
International Evidence on Cash Holdings and Expected Managerial Agency Problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhn068openalex-extracted
Risk Shifting versus Risk Management: Investment Policy in Corporate Pension Plans
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhr011openalex-extracted
Growing Out of Trouble? Corporate Responses to Liability Risk
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hht081openalex-extracted
Risk Choice under High-Water Marks
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhu081openalex-extracted
Capital Supply Uncertainty, Cash Holdings, and Investment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhw059openalex-extracted
Do Firms Engage in Risk-Shifting? Empirical Evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00051openalex-extracted
Agency Costs, Risk Management, and Capital Structure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00062openalex-extracted
How Costly is Financial (Not Economic) Distress? Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions that Became Distressed
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb03709.xopenalex-extracted
Ownership Structure, Deregulation, and Bank Risk Taking
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb02452.xopenalex-extracted
Corporate Debt Value, Bond Covenants, and Optimal Capital Structure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01002.xopenalex-extracted
Optimal Security Design and Dynamic Capital Structure in a Continuous‐Time Agency Model
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01326.xopenalex-extracted
Empirical Evidence of Risk Shifting in Financially Distressed Firms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01372.xopenalex-extracted
Corporate Governance and Risk‐Taking
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01427.xopenalex-extracted
High‐Water Marks: High Risk Appetites? Convex Compensation, Long Horizons, and Portfolio Choice
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01680.xopenalex-extracted
Free Cash Flow, Issuance Costs, and Stock Prices
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01681.xopenalex-extracted
A Unified Theory of Tobin's q , Corporate Investment, Financing, and Risk Management
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01787.xopenalex-extracted
Dynamic Agency and the q Theory of Investment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12199openalex-extracted
Reaching for Yield in the Bond Market
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12421openalex-extracted
Who Borrows from the Lender of Last Resort?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12467openalex-extracted
Bank Leverage and Monetary Policy's Risk‐Taking Channel: Evidence from the United States
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-110311-101821openalex-extracted
Corporate Governance of Financial Institutions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.90.1.147openalex-extracted
Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20150083openalex-extracted
Inducing Leaders to Take Risky Decisions: Dismissal, Tenure, and Term Limits
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20190203openalex-extracted
Learning in Relational Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1815408openalex-extracted
Incentives, Project Choice and Dynamic Multitasking
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2441421openalex-extracted
Inducing Leaders to Take Risky Decisions: Dismissal, Tenure, and Term Limits
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3599483openalex-extracted
How Important Is Moral Hazard For Distressed Banks?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3732831openalex-extracted
Risk Mitigating versus Risk Shifting: Evidence from Banks Security Trading in Crises
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.92288openalex-extracted
Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w14845openalex-extracted
A Unified Theory of Tobin's q, Corporate Investment, Financing, and Risk Management
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w23654openalex-extracted
Which Banks Recover From Large Adverse Shocks?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te2858openalex-extracted
Incentives, project choice, and dynamic multitasking
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