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Splitting Award or Winner Takes All?: Evidence from China’s National Drug Procurement Auction
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inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1002/jae.2264openalex-extracted
NONPARAMETRIC ESTIMATION OF ENTRY COST IN FIRST‐PRICE PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050220openalex-extracted
Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.09.001openalex-extracted
Split-award procurement auctions with uncertain scale economies: Theory and data
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2008.05.004openalex-extracted
Investigating bid preferences at low-price, sealed-bid auctions with endogenous participation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.12.005openalex-extracted
Are bid preferences benign? The effect of small business subsidies in highway procurement auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.10.001openalex-extracted
Split-award contracts with investment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.01.003openalex-extracted
Small business set-asides in procurement auctions: An empirical analysis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/296273openalex-extracted
Sealed Bids, Sunk Costs, and the Process of Competition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdu023openalex-extracted
Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00123openalex-extracted
Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-price Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0741-6261.2008.00005.xopenalex-extracted
Understanding strategic bidding in multi‐unit auctions: a case study of the Texas electricity spot market
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2009.00558.xopenalex-extracted
Entry and Competition Effects in First-Price Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Procurement Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.13061openalex-extracted
Multiple‐Winner Award Rules in Online Procurement Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1155/2015/301734openalex-extracted
Bayes-Nash Equilibrium of the Generalized First-Price Auction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.6.2653openalex-extracted
Bid Preference Programs and Participation in Highway Procurement Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.5.1.1openalex-extracted
Set-Asides and Subsidies in Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2013.1835openalex-extracted
Split-Award Auctions for Supplier Retention
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3940088openalex-extracted
Competitive Bidding in Drug Procurement: Evidence from China
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555732openalex-extracted
Split Awards, Procurement, and Innovation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2999630openalex-extracted
Characterizing Selection Bias Using Experimental Data
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17249415openalex-extracted
The Impacts of National Centralized Drug Procurement Policy on Drug Utilization and Drug Expenditures: The Case of Shenzhen, China
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta10293openalex-extracted
Identification in Auctions With Selective Entry
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