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Pecking order with crowdfunding
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30713-8openalex-extracted
Capital Structure in the Modern World
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-021-04942-wopenalex-extracted
Disentangling Crowdfunding from Fraudfunding
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-018-0037-1openalex-extracted
Market imperfections and crowdfunding
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-018-0125-2openalex-extracted
Third-party signals in equity crowdfunding: the role of prior financing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(84)90023-0openalex-extracted
Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusvent.2013.06.005openalex-extracted
The dynamics of crowdfunding: An exploratory study
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2006.07.001openalex-extracted
Debt-equity choice as a signal of earnings profile over time
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2020.120069openalex-extracted
Why are rewards not delivered on time in rewards-based crowdfunding campaigns? An empirical exploration
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022109010000499openalex-extracted
Debt Capacity and Tests of Capital Structure Theories
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022109023000248openalex-extracted
Online Reputation and Debt Capacity
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/7.1.1openalex-extracted
Optimal Design of Securities under Asymmetric Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20151700openalex-extracted
A Theory of Crowdfunding - A Mechanism Design Approach with Demand Uncertainty and Moral Hazard
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3278openalex-extracted
Learning Through Crowdfunding
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2019.0833openalex-extracted
Signaling to the Crowd: Private Quality Information and Rewards-Based Crowdfunding
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2475025openalex-extracted
Exploiting the Financial Wisdom of the Crowd -- Crowdfunding as a Tool to Aggregate Vague Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3094034openalex-extracted
A Theory of Crowdfunding A Mechanism Design Approach with Demand Uncertainty and Moral Hazard: Comment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1885060openalex-extracted
Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2326770openalex-extracted
Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3003485openalex-extracted
The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-5225-0568-6.ch011openalex-extracted
Crowdfunding as a Marketing Tool
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.1177openalex-snapshot
Quality Signaling Through Crowdfunding Pricing
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