On the public citation graph

Simple Contracts with Double-Sided Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4649083
0 signed · 15 inferred · view as graph

Inferred edges come from two machine sources: sweeps of open repository metadata (mostly SSRN and Zenodo), and a bulk OpenAlex citation snapshot. Every row below is labelled with the one it came from. Neither is a complete citation index — absence here is not evidence of absence.

Is this your work? Sign in with ORCID and put your name on the claims that are yours.
Claim with ORCID
Reference health. See whether every reference in this work resolves to a known work and none has been retracted — and get a dated CiteStamped badge you can embed.
See reference health

What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14200-0openalex-extracted
Contract Theory in Continuous-Time Models
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.01.005openalex-extracted
A model of dynamic compensation and capital structure☆
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104237openalex-extracted
Constrained efficient equilibria in selection markets with continuous types
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1023/b:eufi.0000022158.96140.f8openalex-extracted
Venture Capital Finance: A Security Design Approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6261.00561openalex-extracted
Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6261.00597openalex-extracted
Financing and Advising: Optimal Financial Contracts with Venture Capitalists
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00486.xopenalex-extracted
A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb05140.xopenalex-extracted
Moral Hazard and the Portfolio Management Problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.145134openalex-extracted
Venture Capital Finance: A Security Design Approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4557696openalex-extracted
Optimal Equity Split Under Unobservable Investments
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1882010openalex-extracted
Job Market Signaling
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1912246openalex-extracted
An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555816openalex-extracted
The Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te2992openalex-extracted
Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te4916openalex-extracted
Robust contracting under double moral hazard
Editorial review for independent work. ICSAC — the Institute for Complexity Science and Advanced Computing — runs a structured editorial panel for researchers publishing outside journals, and publishes on CiteStamp rails. Submission is free and goes through ORCID: icsacinstitute.org/submit.