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Affirmative Action in India: Restricted Strategy Space, Complex Constraints, and Direct Mechanism Design
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inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45535-3_9openalex-extracted
A Matroid Generalization of the Stable Matching Polytope
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-005-0215-7openalex-extracted
College admissions with affirmative action
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s41775-023-00162-3openalex-extracted
Priority design for engineering colleges in India
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.08.006openalex-extracted
On lexicographic choice
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.03.003openalex-extracted
School choice: Impossibilities for affirmative action
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.07.001openalex-extracted
A simple characterization of responsive choice
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.004openalex-extracted
School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds Versus Soft Bounds
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.04.007openalex-extracted
Responsive affirmative action in school choice
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.004openalex-extracted
Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: An approach from discrete convex analysis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.104950openalex-extracted
Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2010.05.005openalex-extracted
The College Admissions problem with lower and common quotas
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00096-6openalex-extracted
Stable schedule matching under revealed preference
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaa052openalex-extracted
Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12482openalex-extracted
Lexicographic choice under variable capacity constraints
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3033274.3084085openalex-extracted
Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3328526.3329610openalex-extracted
Centralized Admissions for Engineering Colleges in India
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3465456.3467544openalex-extracted
Processing Reserves Simultaneously
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3490486.3538293openalex-extracted
How to De-reserve Reserves: Admissions to Technical Colleges in India
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.2.585openalex-extracted
Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.5.2050openalex-extracted
Matching with Contracts: Comment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20101552openalex-extracted
Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20130929openalex-extracted
How to Control Controlled School Choice
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20171049openalex-extracted
Large-Scale Affirmative Action in School Choice: Admissions to IITs in India
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20170364openalex-extracted
College Admission with Multidimensional Privileges: The Brazilian Affirmative Action Case
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/inte.2019.1007openalex-extracted
Centralized Admissions for Engineering Colleges in India
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4447openalex-extracted
Choice with Affirmative Action
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2021.1128openalex-extracted
On Capacity-Filling and Substitutable Choice Rules
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2019.1909openalex-extracted
Stable Matching with Proportionality Constraints
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1913392openalex-extracted
Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te1135openalex-extracted
Effective affirmative action in school choice
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te1839openalex-extracted
Matching with slot-specific priorities: Theory
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te2195openalex-extracted
Improving matching under hard distributional constraints
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te2717openalex-extracted
Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2209.06777openalex-extracted
Market Design with Deferred Acceptance: A Recipe for Policymaking
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.002openalex-snapshot
Stability vs. No Justified Envy
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