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Excessive CEO Compensation and Its Justification for Firm Performance Before and After the Covid-19 Pandemic

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4686894
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-xopenalex-extracted
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esr.2021.100749openalex-extracted
Executive compensation and corporate performance of energy companies around the world
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2005.08.005openalex-extracted
CEO compensation, director compensation, and firm performance: Evidence of cronyism?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1010764828523openalex-extracted
Executive Compensation: Excessive or Equitable?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/10913211.2010.10653891openalex-extracted
How Closely Is Ceo Compensation Tied to Performance? an Examination of the U.S. Restaurant Industry
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/209658openalex-extracted
CEO Stock‐Based Compensation: An Empirical Analysis of Incentive‐Intensity, Relative Mix, and Economic Determinants
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6803.2004.00076.xopenalex-extracted
Equity‐Based Compensation for Employees: Firm Performance and Determinants
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6622.1990.tb00207.xopenalex-extracted
CEO INCENTIVES — IT'S NOT HOW MUCH YOU PAY, BUT HOW*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/003355398555702openalex-extracted
Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.46.4.530.12055openalex-extracted
Executive Compensation in the Information Technology Industry
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.24926/265535.1344openalex-extracted
Executive Compensation in the Courts: Board Capture, Optimal Contracting, and Officers' Fiduciary Duties
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.58140/r8gt-dj07openalex-extracted
Pay for Performance … But Not Too Much Pay: The American Public’s View of CEO Pay
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5840/beq200515214openalex-extracted
Do CEOS get Paid too much?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.42-4735openalex-extracted
Pay without performance: the unfulfilled promise of executive compensation
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