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Unpacking the Board Pack: An Examination of Board Risk Reporting

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The use of audit committees for monitoring
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Tone from the top in risk management: A complementarity perspective on how control systems influence risk awareness
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Multiperiod corporate default prediction—A forward intensity approach
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When are outside directors effective?☆
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What do boards really do? Evidence from minutes of board meetings
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.05.009openalex-extracted
Do independent directors cause improvements in firm transparency?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022109016000570openalex-extracted
The Determinants and Performance Impact of Outside Board Leadership
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhl030openalex-extracted
A Theory of Board Control and Size
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Do Managers Always Know Better? The Relative Accuracy of Management and Analyst Forecasts
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The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00891.xopenalex-extracted
Information Control, Career Concerns, and Corporate Governance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01206.xopenalex-extracted
A Theory of Friendly Boards
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12004openalex-extracted
Monitoring Managers: Does It Matter?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3789openalex-extracted
Directors’ Perceptions of Board Effectiveness and Internal Operations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.00360openalex-extracted
Are Audit Committees Overloaded? Evidence from the Effect of Financial Risk Management Oversight on Financial Reporting Quality
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1940433openalex-extracted
What Do Boards Really Do? Evidence from Minutes of Board Meetings
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3358579openalex-extracted
Public Disclosures and Information Asymmetry: A Theory of the Mosaic
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.93988openalex-extracted
The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-51151openalex-extracted
Analysts, Macroeconomic News, and the Benefit of Active In-House Economists
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2004.79.4.1119openalex-extracted
The Influence of Analysts, Institutional Investors, and Insiders on the Incorporation of Market, Industry, and Firm-Specific Information into Stock Prices
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-19-056openalex-extracted
Board Risk Oversight and Corporate Tax-Planning Practices
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2753/imo0020-8825380302openalex-extracted
Risk Management and Board Effectiveness
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2010.48036721openalex-extracted
A Matter of Appearances: How Corporate Leaders Manage the Impressions of Financial Analysts about the Conduct of Their Boards
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2014.0066openalex-extracted
The Quad Model for Identifying a Corporate Director’s Potential for Effective Monitoring: Toward a New Theory of Board Sufficiency
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