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Multi-Criteria Allocation Mechanisms: Constraints and Comparative Statics

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4695785
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

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Minimalstellen von Funktionen und Extremalpunkte
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Budget Feasible Mechanisms on Matroids
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-014-0055-3openalex-extracted
Implementation of reduced form mechanisms: a simple approach and a new characterization
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2013.09.031openalex-extracted
Bayesian optimal knapsack procurement
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.02.009openalex-extracted
Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.104940openalex-extracted
Persuasion with limited communication capacity
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1701997114openalex-extracted
Economics and computer science of a radio spectrum reallocation
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Methods of Measuring the Concentration of Wealth
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/728111openalex-extracted
Redistributive Allocation Mechanisms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjad022openalex-extracted
An Economic Framework for Vaccine Prioritization
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdae013openalex-extracted
Optimal Allocation via Waitlists: Simplicity Through Information Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdz066openalex-extracted
Approximate Random Allocation Mechanisms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/glocom.2010.5684323openalex-extracted
Efficiency-Revenue Optimality Tradeoffs in Dynamic Spectrum Allocation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00033openalex-extracted
Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.xopenalex-extracted
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2692359.2692366openalex-extracted
Budget feasible mechanism design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3490486.3538257openalex-extracted
Constrained Majorization: Applications in Mechanism Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.13.4.581openalex-extracted
Extreme Points of Moment Sets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58openalex-extracted
Optimal Auction Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.8.1.74openalex-extracted
Extreme Points of Certain Sets of Probability Measures, with Applications
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1100.0888openalex-extracted
An Ascending Vickrey Auction for Selling Bases of a Matroid
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2017.1693openalex-extracted
Budget Feasible Procurement Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3551258openalex-extracted
Extreme Points and Majorization: Economic Applications
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3586050openalex-extracted
Markets for Goods with Externalities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3846931openalex-extracted
An Economic Framework for Vaccine Prioritization
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2035788openalex-extracted
Extreme Points of Some Convex Subsets of L 1 (0, 1)
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2020/22openalex-extracted
Mechanism Design for School Choice with Soft Diversity Constraints
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta11405openalex-extracted
Generalized Reduced-Form Auctions: A Network-Flow Approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te2982openalex-extracted
First‐price auctions with budget constraints
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te4663openalex-extracted
Optimal persuasion via bi‐pooling
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te5173openalex-extracted
Optimal disclosure of information to privately informed agents
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262033428.003.0002openalex-extracted
The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction
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