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Countering Price Discrimination with Buyer Information
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(78)90085-6openalex-extracted
Monopoly and product quality
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/722932openalex-extracted
Pareto-Improving Segmentation of Multiproduct Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.001.0001openalex-extracted
An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad100openalex-extracted
Multi-Dimensional Screening: Buyer-Optimal Learning and Informational Robustness
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177700153openalex-extracted
The Existence of Probability Measures with Given Marginals
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1214/aop/1176990236openalex-extracted
Existence of Probability Measures with Given Marginals
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20130848openalex-extracted
The Limits of Price Discrimination
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20160145openalex-extracted
Buyer-Optimal Learning and Monopoly Pricing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20210083openalex-extracted
Consumer Information and the Limits to Competition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20250206openalex-extracted
Screening and Segmenting: A Consumer Surplus Perspective
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3137227openalex-extracted
Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally-Robust Approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3432315openalex-extracted
Market Segmentation Through Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1885625openalex-extracted
Optimal Selling Strategies: When to Haggle, When to Hold Firm
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1913096openalex-extracted
Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2951601openalex-extracted
Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta16297openalex-extracted
Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach
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