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Player Strength and Effort in Contests
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01211819openalex-extracted
The all-pay auction with complete information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0325-yopenalex-extracted
Matching and price competition: beyond symmetric linear costs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00184-010-0321-9openalex-extracted
Log-concavity and monotonicity of hazard and reversed hazard functions of univariate and multivariate skew-normal distributions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0542-5openalex-extracted
Micro foundations of multi-prize lottery contests: a perspective of noisy performance ranking
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01281-zopenalex-extracted
Competitive balance when winning breeds winners
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-007-9242-1openalex-extracted
A stochastic derivation of the ratio form of contest success functions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9774-2openalex-extracted
The optimal prize structure of symmetric Tullock contests
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.04.007openalex-extracted
The value of information in asymmetric all-pay auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.05.006openalex-extracted
Simple equilibria in general contests
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.006openalex-extracted
Asymmetric all-pay contests with heterogeneous prizes
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105065openalex-extracted
How noise affects effort in tournaments
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105377openalex-extracted
On equilibrium existence in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105616openalex-extracted
Optimal contest design: Tuning the heat
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.06.002openalex-extracted
Information in tournaments under limited liability
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.02.004openalex-extracted
Innovation contests with entry auction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102512openalex-extracted
Winner’s effort maximization in large contests
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.serev.2022.100004openalex-extracted
Effort maximization in contests under balance constraints
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261010openalex-extracted
Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12380openalex-extracted
THE OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF PRIZES IN TOURNAMENTS OF HETEROGENEOUS AGENTS
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177703287openalex-extracted
On the Distribution of the Number of Successes in Independent Trials
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.5.2230openalex-extracted
Asymmetric Contests with Conditional Investments
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.91.3.542openalex-extracted
The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.41.4.1137openalex-extracted
The Economic Design of Sporting Contests
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200422openalex-extracted
Contest Design with Stochastic Performance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.311964openalex-extracted
Investment in the Absence of Property Rights: The Role of Incumbency Advantages
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3865781openalex-extracted
Differential Treatment and the Winner's Effort in Contests with Incomplete Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911749openalex-extracted
Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Points for Concave N-Person Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta6688openalex-extracted
Two New Conditions Supporting the First-Order Approach to Multisignal Principal-Agent Problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te3672openalex-extracted
On the optimal design of biased contests
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te4259openalex-extracted
Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs
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