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Efx Allocations for Indivisible Chores: Matching-Based Approach

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4756346
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2023.103965openalex-extracted
Fair division of indivisible goods: Recent progress and open questions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2020.07.006openalex-extracted
Multiple birds with one stone: Beating 1/2 for EFX and GMMS via envy cycle elimination
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511598975openalex-extracted
Fair Division
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781107446984openalex-extracted
Handbook of Computational Social Choice
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/664613openalex-extracted
The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/focs.2016.52openalex-extracted
A Discrete and Bounded Envy-Free Cake Cutting Protocol for Any Number of Agents
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611975031.164openalex-extracted
Envy-free Chore Division for An Arbitrary Number of Agents
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611975031.165openalex-extracted
Almost Envy-Freeness with General Valuations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2940716.2940726openalex-extracted
The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3219166.3219176openalex-extracted
Finding Fair and Efficient Allocations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3355902openalex-extracted
The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3382131openalex-extracted
Technical perspective: An answer to fair division's most enigmatic question
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3391403.3399511openalex-extracted
EFX Exists for Three Agents
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3485447.3512057openalex-extracted
Almost (Weighted) Proportional Allocations for Indivisible Chores✱✱
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3618116openalex-extracted
Unified Fair Allocation of Goods and Chores via Copies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/988772.988792openalex-extracted
On approximately fair allocations of indivisible goods
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1201/9781439863855openalex-extracted
Cake-Cutting Algorithms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2022.0044openalex-extracted
Extension of Additive Valuations to General Valuations on the Existence of EFX
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5545openalex-extracted
Multiple Birds with One Stone: Beating 1/2 for EFX and GMMS via Envy Cycle Elimination
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16675openalex-extracted
Almost Envy-freeness, Envy-rank, and Nash Social Welfare Matchings
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v36i5.20410openalex-extracted
Almost Full EFX Exists for Four Agents
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1907319openalex-extracted
Sur la division pragmatique
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1902.04319openalex-extracted
Envy-freeness up to any item with high Nash welfare: The virtue of donating items
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2005.04864openalex-extracted
The Fairness of Leximin in Allocation of Indivisible Chores
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2107.09901openalex-extracted
Extension of Additive Valuations to General Valuations on the Existence of EFX
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2109.07313openalex-extracted
Approximately EFX Allocations for Indivisible Chores
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2205.07638openalex-extracted
EFX Allocations: Simplifications and Improvements
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2211.15836openalex-extracted
On the Envy-free Allocation of Chores
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/2954.001.0001openalex-extracted
Fair Division and Collective Welfare
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