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Market Design with Deferred Acceptance: A Recipe for Characterizations

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4783458
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

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Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
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Counting combinatorial choice rules
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School choice: Impossibilities for affirmative action
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.001openalex-extracted
Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: Strategy-proofness and comparative statics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.004openalex-extracted
School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds Versus Soft Bounds
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.12.005openalex-extracted
On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.12.006openalex-extracted
Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0021-9800(68)80039-0openalex-extracted
Optimal assignments in an ordered set: An application of matroid theory
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00096-6openalex-extracted
Stable schedule matching under revealed preference
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108937535.011openalex-extracted
Choice and Market Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267112000296openalex-extracted
ON THE AXIOMATICS OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION: INTERPRETING THE CONSISTENCY PRINCIPLE
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/00029890.1962.11989827openalex-extracted
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaa052openalex-extracted
Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/tac.1981.1102777openalex-extracted
General theory of best variants choice: Some aspects
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00020openalex-extracted
The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02121.xopenalex-extracted
What Have We Learned from Market Design?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12482openalex-extracted
Lexicographic choice under variable capacity constraints
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/1993574.1993585openalex-extracted
Reserve prices in internet advertising auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01542openalex-extracted
Constitutional Implementation of Affirmative Action Policies in India
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/000282803322157061openalex-extracted
School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828054825466openalex-extracted
Matching with Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.5.2050openalex-extracted
Matching with Contracts: Comment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20101552openalex-extracted
Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20130929openalex-extracted
How to Control Controlled School Choice
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20210096openalex-extracted
Matching Mechanisms for Refugee Resettlement
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20171049openalex-extracted
Large-Scale Affirmative Action in School Choice: Admissions to IITs in India
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4566openalex-extracted
How to De-Reserve Reserves: Admissions to Technical Colleges in India
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.28.1.103.14256openalex-extracted
A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2021.2184openalex-extracted
School Choice in Chile
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4592036openalex-extracted
Affirmative Action in India: Restricted Strategy Space, Complex Constraints, and Direct Mechanism Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1914037openalex-extracted
Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta7443openalex-extracted
Axioms for Deferred Acceptance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te1135openalex-extracted
Effective affirmative action in school choice
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te1839openalex-extracted
Matching with slot-specific priorities: Theory
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te2717openalex-extracted
Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition
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