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When Does Linking Pay to Default Reduce Bank Risk?
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
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The Ethics of Hedging by Executives
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Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
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Bonus Taxes and International Competition for Bank Managers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101576openalex-extracted
Compensation regulation in banking: Executive director behavior and bank performance after the EU bonus cap
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2024.107299openalex-extracted
Banks Incentive Pay, Diversification and Systemic Risk
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.05.012openalex-extracted
Direct and indirect risk-taking incentives of inside debt
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.08.019openalex-extracted
Managerial Overconfidence and Bank Bailouts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2014.11.006openalex-extracted
Inside Debt, Bank Default Risk and Performance during the Crisis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2017.03.001openalex-extracted
Optimal pay regulation for too-big-to-fail banks
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.03.015openalex-extracted
Optimal compensation contracts when managers can hedge
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.08.010openalex-extracted
Bank CEO incentives and the credit crisis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2014.03.003openalex-extracted
Risk shifting in the US banking system: An empirical analysis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jimonfin.2020.102153openalex-extracted
How post-crisis regulation has affected bank CEO compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grr024openalex-extracted
Why bank governance is different
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaa043openalex-extracted
Only Time Will Tell: A Theory of Deferred Compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhr028openalex-extracted
Investor Reactions to CEOs' Inside Debt Incentives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfu049openalex-extracted
Executive Compensation and Risk Taking
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12355openalex-extracted
Regulation of Compensation and Systemic Risk: Evidence from the UK
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12752openalex-extracted
Executive Deferral Plans and Insider Trading
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/fima.12083openalex-extracted
Why Do Insiders Hedge Their Ownership? An Empirical Examination
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-036x.2013.12024.xopenalex-extracted
Regulating Banking Bonuses in the European Union: A Case Study in Unintended Consequences
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00631.xopenalex-extracted
Compensation, Incentives, and the Duality of Risk Aversion and Riskiness
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01251.xopenalex-extracted
Pay Me Later: Inside Debt and Its Role in Managerial Compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01736.xopenalex-extracted
The Case for Intervening in Bankers’ Pay
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12382openalex-extracted
CEO investment of deferred compensation plans and firm performance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/joes.12101openalex-extracted
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF BANKS: A SURVEY
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13160openalex-extracted
The Economics of Deferral and Clawback Requirements
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2013.1813openalex-extracted
Inside Debt and the Design of Corporate Debt Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2332openalex-extracted
Determinants and Trading Performance of Equity Deferrals by Corporate Outside Directors
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2395982openalex-extracted
Getting Incentives Right: Is Deferred Bank Executive Compensation Sufficient?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2817406openalex-extracted
The Practice and Tax Consequences of Nonqualified Deferred Compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2960191openalex-extracted
How Post-Crisis Regulation Has Affected Bank CEO Compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3232708openalex-extracted
Only Time Will Tell: A Theory of Deferred Compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4554195openalex-extracted
Inefficient Bank Recapitalization, Bailout, and Post-Crisis Recoveries
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1123473openalex-extracted
Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation of Incentive Compatibility
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2676287openalex-extracted
Managerial Ownership, Incentive Contracting, and the Use of Zero-Cost Collars and Equity Swaps by Corporate Insiders
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