On the public citation graph

Know Thy Enemy: Information Acquisition in Contests

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4866018
0 signed · 73 inferred · view as graph

Inferred edges come from two machine sources: sweeps of open repository metadata (mostly SSRN and Zenodo), and a bulk OpenAlex citation snapshot. Every row below is labelled with the one it came from. Neither is a complete citation index — absence here is not evidence of absence.

Is this your work? Sign in with ORCID and put your name on the claims that are yours.
Claim with ORCID
Reference health. See whether every reference in this work resolves to a known work and none has been retracted — and get a dated CiteStamped badge you can embed.
See reference health

What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0040openalex-extracted
Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions with Incomplete Information: The Two-Player Case
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.2208openalex-extracted
An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-18058-5_17openalex-extracted
The Theory of Technological Competition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79182-9_27openalex-extracted
Strategic Buyers and the Social Cost of Monopoly
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79182-9_44openalex-extracted
Competition over More Than One Prize
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_18openalex-extracted
Rigging the lobbying process: An application of the all-pay auction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_19openalex-extracted
Caps on Political Lobbying
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_2openalex-extracted
Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00155672openalex-extracted
The social cost of rent-seeking: First estimates
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01211819openalex-extracted
The all-pay auction with complete information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0525-2openalex-extracted
Communication of preferences in contests for contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0710-6openalex-extracted
Information acquisition in conflicts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0778-7openalex-extracted
Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-022-01422-8openalex-extracted
Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0229-7openalex-extracted
Altruism and envy in contests: An evolutionarily stable symbiosis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-008-0059-2openalex-extracted
Non-existence of equilibrium in Vickrey, second-price, and English auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-020-00242-3openalex-extracted
All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents’ values
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9662-1openalex-extracted
On disclosure policy in contests with stochastic entry
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0176-2680(94)00042-iopenalex-extracted
Contests with spying
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2008.08.005openalex-extracted
Private versus complete information in auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.10.014openalex-extracted
Disclosure policy in a multi-prize all-pay auction with stochastic abilities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.08.038openalex-extracted
The optimal disclosure policy in contests with stochastic entry: A Bayesian persuasion perspective
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.030openalex-extracted
Information sharing in private value lottery contest
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109000openalex-extracted
Information sharing in a contest game with group identity
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.10.015openalex-extracted
Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.01.013openalex-extracted
Information feedback in a dynamic tournament
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.015openalex-extracted
Optimal auctions with information acquisition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.10.005openalex-extracted
Entry and espionage with noisy signals
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.006openalex-extracted
Information revelation in auctions with common and private values
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.005openalex-extracted
Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions Redux
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.11.002openalex-extracted
Multidimensional private value auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.018openalex-extracted
Information acquisition during a Dutch auction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.003openalex-extracted
Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.02.005openalex-extracted
Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.10.010openalex-extracted
All-pay auctions with affiliated binary signals
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.01.006openalex-extracted
On Disclosure Policies in All-pay Auctions with Stochastic Entry
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102518openalex-extracted
Optimal Information Exchange in Contests
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-7187(03)00033-xopenalex-extracted
Innovative activity and sunk cost
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0176-2680(96)00028-6openalex-extracted
Contests with spying: A comment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0176-2680(96)00030-4openalex-extracted
Contests with spying: Reply
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00126-xopenalex-extracted
Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00177-5openalex-extracted
Games with espionage
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139519366openalex-extracted
Contest Theory
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/10168739900000040openalex-extracted
An Inquiry Into the Rationale for Economic Espionage*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190625979.013.440openalex-extracted
Contests: Theory and Topics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199549597.001.0001openalex-extracted
Strategy and Dynamics in Contests
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00096openalex-extracted
Information Acquisition in Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.t01-1-00142openalex-extracted
Competitive Bidding in Auctions with Private and Common Values
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12402openalex-extracted
Information disclosure in dynamic research contests
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/caje.12190openalex-extracted
Disclosure policy in Tullock contests with asymmetric stochastic entry
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12504openalex-extracted
RANKING DISCLOSURE POLICIES IN ALL‐PAY AUCTIONS
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12277openalex-extracted
Information Disclosure in Contests: A Bayesian Persuasion Approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1967.tb01923.xopenalex-extracted
THE WELFARE COSTS OF TARIFFS, MONOPOLIES, AND THEFT
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2012.00475.xopenalex-extracted
Information Gathering Externalities for a Multi‐Attribute Good
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1989.tb00003.xopenalex-extracted
POLITICALLY CONTESTABLE RENTS AND TRANSFERS*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2010.00255.xopenalex-extracted
Information Gathering and Marketing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12105openalex-extracted
Information Sharing in Contests
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12180openalex-extracted
Business Intelligence and Multimarket Competition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3391403.3399530openalex-extracted
Information Choice in Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3465456.3467532openalex-extracted
Optimal Feedback in Contests
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/000282803322157025openalex-extracted
Optimal Design of Research Contests
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.96.3.756openalex-extracted
On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing, and Product Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.96.4.1355openalex-extracted
Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20190234openalex-extracted
Showing Off or Laying Low? The Economics of Psych-outs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200230openalex-extracted
Disclosure and Favoritism in Sequential Elimination Contests
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1120858openalex-extracted
Information Gathering and Marketing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2016011openalex-extracted
Information Acquisition During a Dutch Auction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3123831openalex-extracted
Voluntary Disclosure in Asymmetric Contests
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3190093openalex-extracted
Industrial Espionage in Duopoly Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.367460openalex-extracted
Altruism and Envy in Contests: An Evolutionarily Stable Symbiosis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.24883/iberoamericanic.v2i2.43openalex-extracted
Proven Strategies in Competitive Intelligence: Lessons from the Trenches
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta6640openalex-extracted
Signal Orderings Based on Dispersion and the Supply of Private Information in Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta7537openalex-extracted
All-Pay Contests
Editorial review for independent work. ICSAC — the Institute for Complexity Science and Advanced Computing — runs a structured editorial panel for researchers publishing outside journals, and publishes on CiteStamp rails. Submission is free and goes through ORCID: icsacinstitute.org/submit.