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Information Design in Repeated Hold-up Problems

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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-3641-9openalex-extracted
Managerial Uses of Accounting Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11129-013-9132-4openalex-extracted
Manufacturer marketing initiatives and retailer information sharing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.06.007openalex-extracted
Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2013.09.020openalex-extracted
Sustaining long-term supply chain partnerships using price-only contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2011.11.007openalex-extracted
Corporate suppliers and customers and accounting conservatism
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2012.10.001openalex-extracted
A Measurement Approach to Conservatism and Earnings Management
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2020.101319openalex-extracted
Effects of accounting conservatism on investment efficiency and innovation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101571openalex-extracted
Accounting Conservatism and Relational Contracting
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101769openalex-extracted
Reporting Regulation and Corporate Innovation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4101(97)00014-1openalex-extracted
The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings1
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0361-3682(00)00017-9openalex-extracted
Incentive issues in inter-firm relationships
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1011330003876openalex-extracted
The Demand for Accounting Conservatism for Management Control
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/00207543.2020.1791999openalex-extracted
Outcomes of supply chain dependence asymmetry: a systematic review of the statistical evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/704387openalex-extracted
Moving the Goalposts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/jla/law001openalex-extracted
Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network Governance in Procurement Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00195openalex-extracted
Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12080openalex-extracted
Investing in a relationship
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12295openalex-extracted
Information control in the hold‐up problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0741-6261.2008.00013.xopenalex-extracted
Information and bargaining in the hold-up problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00526.xopenalex-extracted
A Dynamic Theory of Holdup
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0335.2009.00843.xopenalex-extracted
Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-679x.2009.00336.xopenalex-extracted
Accounting Conservatism and the Efficiency of Debt Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00071.xopenalex-extracted
Information and the hold‐up problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/003355302753399445openalex-extracted
Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/000282803321455232openalex-extracted
Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/000282803322157115openalex-extracted
Relational Incentive Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.6.2590openalex-extracted
Bayesian Persuasion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.45.3.595openalex-extracted
Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20170405openalex-extracted
Dynamic Evaluation Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1070.0708openalex-extracted
Supply Chain Relationships and Contracts: The Impact of Repeated Interaction on Capacity Investment and Procurement
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.31.2.163openalex-extracted
Capital Rationing and Organizational Slack in Capital Budgeting
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.46.2.205.11927openalex-extracted
Capital Budgeting, the Hold-up Problem, and Information System Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1406/32746openalex-extracted
Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400845354-027openalex-extracted
25. Relational Incentive Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3686089openalex-extracted
Information Design in Financial Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2090458openalex-extracted
Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2118358openalex-extracted
Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2118440openalex-extracted
Arm's Length Relationships
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2491373openalex-extracted
Information Rents and Preferences among Information Systems in a Model of Resource Allocation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-10216openalex-extracted
Process Integration and Information Sharing in Supply Chains
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-51707openalex-extracted
Divide and Inform: Rationing Information to Facilitate Persuasion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2001.76.4.471openalex-extracted
Conservatism, Optimal Disclosure Policy, and the Timeliness of Financial Reports
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-9712114165openalex-extracted
The Interaction Between Decision and Control Problems and the Value of Information.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429494338-12openalex-extracted
Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.58140/gsb-6042openalex-extracted
The Greening of Wal-Mart’s Supply Chain
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.7249/p2758openalex-extracted
Management control systems.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00013.xopenalex-snapshot
Information and bargaining in the hold-up problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.276122openalex-snapshot
On Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2021-0175openalex-snapshot
Asymmetric Disclosure, Noise Trade, and Firm Valuation
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