On the public citation graph
Information Design and Pricing of Supply Competition in Lead-Selling Platforms
0 signed · 31 inferred · view as graph
Inferred edges come from two machine sources: sweeps of open repository metadata (mostly SSRN and Zenodo), and a bulk OpenAlex citation snapshot. Every row below is labelled with the one it came from. Neither is a complete citation index — absence here is not evidence of absence.
Is this your work? Sign in with ORCID and put your name on the
claims that are yours.
Reference health. See whether every reference in this work resolves to a
known work and none has been retracted — and get a dated CiteStamped
badge you can embed.
What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050079openalex-snapshot
Population uncertainty and Poisson games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(87)90113-xopenalex-snapshot
Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.07.006openalex-snapshot
Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-14891-7openalex-snapshot
Human competition is not lower if competing is socially wasteful instead of socially beneficial
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/701813openalex-snapshot
The Simple Economics of Optimal Persuasion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a042036openalex-snapshot
THE LOGIT AS A MODEL OF PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdae013openalex-snapshot
Optimal Allocation via Waitlists: Simplicity Through Information Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3033274.3085152openalex-snapshot
Algorithmic Persuasion with No Externalities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1177/10591478241239931openalex-snapshot
Persuading Skeptics and Fans in the Presence of Additional Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20181489openalex-snapshot
Information Design: A Unified Perspective
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3420openalex-snapshot
Warning Against Recurring Risks: An Information Design Approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3580openalex-snapshot
Persuading Customers to Buy Early: The Value of Personalized Information Provisioning
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4016openalex-snapshot
Informing the Public About a Pandemic
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4151openalex-snapshot
Engineering Social Learning: Information Design of Time-Locked Sales Campaigns for Online Platforms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4548openalex-snapshot
Information Design for Congested Social Services: Optimal Need-Based Persuasion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4677openalex-snapshot
Information Disclosure and Promotion Policy Design for Platforms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4894openalex-snapshot
Information Provision in Two-Sided Platforms: Optimizing for Supply
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2018.1819openalex-snapshot
Optimal Signaling Mechanisms in Unobservable Queues
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2022.2402openalex-snapshot
Strategic Release of Information in Platforms: Entry, Competition, and Welfare
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2023.2438openalex-snapshot
Persuading Risk-Conscious Agents: A Geometric Approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.5.2.266openalex-snapshot
Discrete-Variable Extremum Problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555693openalex-snapshot
Resolving Uncertainty about the Number of Bidders in Independent Private- Value Auctions: An Experimental Analysis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta13251openalex-snapshot
Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te1808openalex-snapshot
Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4727705openalex-extracted
Managing Newsvendors via Demand Shifting
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.07399openalex-snapshot
The Welfare Effects of Selling Leads in a Two-Sided Marketplace
Editorial review for independent work. ICSAC — the Institute for Complexity
Science and Advanced Computing — runs a structured editorial panel for researchers
publishing outside journals, and publishes on CiteStamp rails. Submission is free
and goes through ORCID: icsacinstitute.org/submit.