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A Mechanism for Addressing Compliance and Participation in Global Public Good Treaties: A Comment

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4882534
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

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Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities
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Membership rules and stability of coalition structures in positive externality games
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Renegotiation-Proof Climate Agreements with Full Participation: Conditions for Pareto-Efficiency
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-012-9624-9openalex-snapshot
On the Private Provision of Intertemporal Public Goods with Stock Effects
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Hope or Despair? Formal Models of Climate Cooperation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-021-00597-3openalex-snapshot
Long-Term Climate Treaties with a Refunding Club
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(92)90095-eopenalex-snapshot
Theoretical foundations of negotiations and cost sharing in transfrontier pollution problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(93)90037-topenalex-snapshot
Strategies for the international protection of the environment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(89)90021-3openalex-snapshot
Renegotiation in repeated games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.07.013openalex-snapshot
A climate agreement with full participation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2009.05.006openalex-snapshot
Can international environmental cooperation be bought?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103423openalex-snapshot
The strategic dimension of financing global public goods
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104397openalex-snapshot
The problem of financing global public goods
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.10.015openalex-snapshot
The anti-paradox of cooperation: Diversity may pay!
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.08.004openalex-snapshot
Equilibrium binding agreements: a comment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.10.006openalex-snapshot
Providing Public Goods in the Absence of Strong Institutions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.07.005openalex-snapshot
Climate agreements in a mitigation-adaptation game
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2014.07.003openalex-snapshot
Sharing R&D investments in cleaner technologies to mitigate climate change
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511560019.010openalex-snapshot
Non-cooperative models of coalition formation in games with spillovers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s1355770x12000289openalex-snapshot
Asymmetries in international environmental agreements
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1005016623915openalex-snapshot
Toward a positive theory of coalition formation and endogenous instrumental choice in global pollution control
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1008211729093openalex-snapshot
Renegotiation–Proof Equilibria in a Global Emission Game When Players Are Impatient
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1020911130175openalex-snapshot
Quotas May Beat Taxes in a Global Emission Game
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/46.supplement_1.878openalex-snapshot
Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2009.02111.xopenalex-snapshot
CARTEL STABILITY UNDER AN OPTIMAL SHARING RULE*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20191546openalex-snapshot
Global Public Goods: A Survey
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1561/101.00000078openalex-snapshot
International Environmental Agreements: Doomed to Fail or Destined to Succeed? A Review of the Literature
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1628/0932456022975169openalex-snapshot
Consensus Treaties
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/134972openalex-snapshot
On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4337/9781781009888.00010openalex-snapshot
Non-cooperative models of coalition formation in games with spillovers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4337/9781781950173.00011openalex-snapshot
Stability and design of international environmental agreements: the case of transboundary pollution
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4337/9781840648218.00008openalex-snapshot
Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation: Any Practical Application?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4337/9781843762898openalex-snapshot
Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation
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