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Optimal Search Auctions with a Deadline

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4925101
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inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_17openalex-snapshot
Dynamic Reserve Prices for Repeated Auctions: Learning from Bids
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-019-01192-8openalex-snapshot
Equilibrium competition, social welfare and corruption in procurement auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(76)90034-xopenalex-snapshot
Job search in a dynamic economy
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90098-1openalex-snapshot
Search mechanisms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103681openalex-snapshot
The Optimal Sequence of Prices and Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.12.010openalex-snapshot
Sequential auctions with randomly arriving buyers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.006openalex-snapshot
Auction Timing and Market Thickness
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.003openalex-snapshot
Optimal search auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.10.010openalex-snapshot
Optimal advertising of auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.006openalex-snapshot
Auctions with dynamic populations: Efficiency and revenue maximization
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.10.007openalex-snapshot
Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.08.003openalex-snapshot
Do auctions induce a winner's curse? New evidence from the corporate takeover market☆
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.06.002openalex-snapshot
Negotiations under the threat of an auction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.rpm.5170123openalex-snapshot
The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/686713openalex-snapshot
Revenue Management with Forward-Looking Buyers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvx017openalex-snapshot
Ordered Consumer Search
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12551openalex-snapshot
SEQUENTIAL SEARCH WITH ADAPTIVE INTENSITY
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01225.xopenalex-snapshot
How Are Firms Sold?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2517-6161.1979.tb01068.xopenalex-snapshot
Bandit Processes and Dynamic Allocation Indices
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13235openalex-snapshot
Optimal Sequential Selling Mechanism and Deal Protections in Mergers and Acquisitions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12355openalex-snapshot
Seller Compound Search for Bidders*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2940716.2940760openalex-snapshot
Descending Price Optimally Coordinates Search
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.4.1544openalex-snapshot
Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20180892openalex-snapshot
Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.15.2.103openalex-snapshot
New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20140137openalex-snapshot
Entry Deterrence in Dynamic Second-Price Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20190114openalex-snapshot
Orchestrating Information Acquisition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.3018openalex-snapshot
It Is Time to Get Some Rest
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4142openalex-snapshot
Sales Effort Management Under All-or-Nothing Constraint
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2013.0595openalex-snapshot
Optimal Dynamic Auctions and Simple Index Rules
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58openalex-snapshot
Optimal Auction Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1910412openalex-snapshot
Optimal Search for the Best Alternative
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1912661openalex-snapshot
Optimal Search
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2297768openalex-snapshot
Search and Optimal Sample Sizes
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2526161openalex-snapshot
A Compound Strategy for Search in the Labor Market
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555399openalex-snapshot
A Theory of Preemptive Takeover Bidding
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta14837openalex-snapshot
Consumer Search and Price Competition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta9969openalex-snapshot
Search With Adverse Selection
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