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Information Design in Allocation with Costly Verification: Multiple Agents

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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01463-5openalex-extracted

Optimal Multi-unit Allocation with Costly Verification

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-012-0559-2openalex-extracted

Optimization and mechanism design

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105000openalex-extracted

Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/10556788.2016.1277996openalex-extracted

Optimal allocation with costly inspection and discrete types under ambiguity

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.12.3779openalex-extracted

Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20140494openalex-extracted

Optimal Allocation with Ex Post Verification and Limited Penalties

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3219openalex-extracted

Distributionally Robust Mechanism Design

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2764458openalex-extracted

Mechanism Design with Costly Verification and Limited Punishments

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2886456openalex-extracted

Informationally Robust Optimal Auction Design

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3137227openalex-extracted

Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally-Robust Approach

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3407031openalex-extracted

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4245445openalex-extracted

Information Design in Allocation with Costly Verification

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4284585openalex-extracted

Distributionally Robust Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta14991openalex-extracted

Mechanisms With Evidence: Commitment and Robustness

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta14993openalex-extracted

Robust Mechanisms Under Common Valuation

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta16297openalex-extracted

Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105403openalex-snapshot

Correlation-robust auction design

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12754openalex-snapshot

INFORMATION DESIGN IN ALLOCATION WITH COSTLY VERIFICATION

Editorial review for independent work. ICSAC — the Institute for Complexity Science and Advanced Computing — runs a structured editorial panel for researchers publishing outside journals, and publishes on CiteStamp rails. Submission is free and goes through ORCID: icsacinstitute.org/submit.