On the public citation graph
New Wine in Old Bottles: Unintended Financial Dominance and Central Banking Myopia
0 signed · 173 inferred · view as graph
Inferred edges come from two machine sources: sweeps of open repository metadata (mostly SSRN and Zenodo), and a bulk OpenAlex citation snapshot. Every row below is labelled with the one it came from. Neither is a complete citation index — absence here is not evidence of absence.
Is this your work? Sign in with ORCID and put your name on the
claims that are yours.
Reference health. See whether every reference in this work resolves to a
known work and none has been retracted — and get a dated CiteStamped
badge you can embed.
What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-26072-0_3openalex-extracted
The Economics of Central Banking
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01000390openalex-extracted
Designing a central bank: Social player, monetary agent, or banking agent?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02707752openalex-extracted
The case for rules in the conduct of monetary policy: A concrete example
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11079-006-4739-7openalex-extracted
E Pluribus Unum? Authorities' Design in Financial Supervision: Trends and Determinants
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11079-017-9447-yopenalex-extracted
Populism and Central Bank Independence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11079-019-09550-wopenalex-extracted
Populism, Political Pressure and Central Bank (in)Dependence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-004-6159-9openalex-extracted
Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-018-9324-5openalex-extracted
Independent central banks and banking crisis liquidity
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s40797-023-00225-7openalex-extracted
The Spectre of Financial Dominance in the Eurozone
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s43253-024-00115-3openalex-extracted
The contradictions of unconventional monetary policy as a post-2008 thwarting mechanism: financial dominance, shadow banking, and inequality
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0164-0704(85)90036-9openalex-extracted
The relationship between government deficits, money growthm and inflation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0164-0704(85)90079-5openalex-extracted
Deficit spending, money, and inflation: Some international empirical evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0164-0704(87)90004-8openalex-extracted
Cross-country evidence on the relationship between central banks and governments
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2231(85)90031-4openalex-extracted
Money, deficits, and inflation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2231(93)90003-fopenalex-extracted
Designing institutions for monetary stability
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2231(93)90009-lopenalex-extracted
Discretion versus policy rules in practice
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0261-5606(87)90011-8openalex-extracted
Are money growth and inflation related to government deficits? evidence from ten industrialized economies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3932(78)90053-3openalex-extracted
Deficits, government spending, and inflation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3932(81)90016-7openalex-extracted
Factors affecting monetary policy in an era of inflation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3932(81)90057-xopenalex-extracted
Deficits, money and inflation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3932(83)90041-7openalex-extracted
Government borrowing and monetary accommodation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3932(83)90051-xopenalex-extracted
Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3932(85)90004-2openalex-extracted
The backing of government bonds and monetarism
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.009openalex-extracted
Cross-checking optimal monetary policy with information from the Taylor rule
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.12.038openalex-extracted
Central Bank Independence and Macro-Prudential Regulation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2024.106823openalex-extracted
Macroprudential capital requirements, monetary policy, and financial crises
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2024.106931openalex-extracted
Monetary and macroprudential policies: How to Be green? A political-economy approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecosys.2024.101188openalex-extracted
Monetary and fiscal interplay: Does it work both ways?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eeh.2018.12.002openalex-extracted
Budget deficits and money creation: Exploring their relation before Bretton Woods
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2006.02.001openalex-extracted
Divide et impera: Financial supervision unification and central bank fragmentation effect
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.09.005openalex-extracted
Does central bank independence still matter?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2017.05.005openalex-extracted
Central bankers as supervisors: Do crises matter?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2021.102091openalex-extracted
Monetary policy decision-making by committee: Why, when and how it can work
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2021.102143openalex-extracted
Political voice on monetary policy: Evidence from the parliamentary hearings of the European Central Bank
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.05.002openalex-extracted
Monetary policy committees and interest rate setting
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gfj.2019.100490openalex-extracted
Macroprudential policy in the EU: A political economy perspective
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2021.105991openalex-extracted
Allocating supervisory responsibilities to central bankers: Does national culture matter?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2006.06.004openalex-extracted
Monetary and financial stability: Here to stay?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.07.031openalex-extracted
The financial cycle and macroeconomics: What have we learnt?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2015.05.016openalex-extracted
Inflation targeting: Is IT to blame for banking system instability?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2022.106536openalex-extracted
Monetary policy reaction function and the financial cycle
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.03.004openalex-extracted
Financial supervision structure, decentralized decision-making and financing constraints
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2014.09.006openalex-extracted
Federal reserve independence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2018.01.046openalex-extracted
A model of fiscal dominance under the “Reinhart Conjecture”
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2020.100834openalex-extracted
Inflation targeting and financial conditions: UK monetary policy during the great moderation and financial crisis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jimonfin.2015.11.002openalex-extracted
Macro prudential governance and central banks: Facts and drivers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jimonfin.2021.102579openalex-extracted
Independence, conservatism, and beyond: Monetary policy, central bank governance and central banker preferences (1981–2021)
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2011.11.008openalex-extracted
How do business and financial cycles interact?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2011.09.001openalex-extracted
Using inflation to erode the US public debt
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2011.09.005openalex-extracted
The optimal choice of central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2017.04.004openalex-extracted
Financial shocks, financial stability, and optimal Taylor rules
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2020.103281openalex-extracted
Inflation and Exchange Rate Targeting Challenges Under Fiscal Dominance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2022.103469openalex-extracted
Classification of Monetary and Fiscal Dominance Regimes Using Machine Learning Techniques
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2004.06.003openalex-extracted
Fiscal deficits and inflation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2014.12.003openalex-extracted
Macroeconomic volatility and external imbalances
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2017.07.004openalex-extracted
Cost-benefit analysis of leaning against the wind
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2024.103576openalex-extracted
Abrupt monetary policy change and unanchoring of inflation expectations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpolmod.2014.07.004openalex-extracted
Deficit sustainability, and monetary versus fiscal dominance: The case of Spain, 1850–2000
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpolmod.2024.06.008openalex-extracted
Fiscal stance role for ECB monetary policy
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.najef.2020.101164openalex-extracted
Does inflation targeting cause financial instability?: An empirical test of paradox of credibility hypothesis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0014-2921(00)00098-2openalex-extracted
Revisiting the case for a populist central banker
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0014-2921(98)00045-2openalex-extracted
Checks and balances, and the supply of central bank independence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0014-2921(98)00127-5openalex-extracted
The case for a populist Central Banker
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511559624.009openalex-extracted
The Operation of the Specie Standard: Evidence for Core and Peripheral Countries, 1880–1990
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511762802.004openalex-extracted
The Principal-Agent Approach to Monetary Policy Delegation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139506762openalex-extracted
Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0968565012000157openalex-extracted
Long-run fiscal dominance in Argentina, 1875–1990
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0968565015000177openalex-extracted
Ups and downs of central bank independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: theory, institutions and empirics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230226203.0210openalex-extracted
central bank independence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1057/be.2013.15openalex-extracted
The Effectiveness of Central Bank Independence vs. Policy Rules
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1057/imfer.2011.8openalex-extracted
Financial Crises, Credit Booms, and External Imbalances: 140 Years of Lessons
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1057/s41308-024-00258-7openalex-extracted
Macroprudential Governance and Capacity to Remove the Punch Bowl
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2013.861586openalex-extracted
Is financial repression a solution to reduce fiscal vulnerability? The example of France since the end of World War II
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/15140326.2002.12040569openalex-extracted
Central Bank Independence, Democracy, and Dollarization
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/260580openalex-extracted
Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/260699openalex-extracted
Unanticipated Money, Output, and the Price Level in the United States
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahy011openalex-extracted
A Theoretical Framework for Law and Macroeconomics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/cesifo/ifaa020openalex-extracted
Furor over the Fed: A President’s Tweets and Central Bank Independence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/cje/beaf020openalex-extracted
Financial dominance: why the ‘market maker of last resort’ is a bad idea and what to do about it
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/epolic/eiac011openalex-extracted
The political economy of reforms in Central Bank design: evidence from a new dataset
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/epolic/eiad020openalex-extracted
Exchange rate and inflation under weak monetary policy: Turkey verifies theory
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/epolic/eiv003openalex-extracted
The Liquidation of Government Debt
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjy033openalex-extracted
Exchange Arrangements Entering the Twenty-First Century: Which Anchor will Hold?*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwz017openalex-extracted
Masters of the ‘masters of the universe’? Monetary, fiscal and financial dominance in the Eurozone
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1108/13581980810918387openalex-extracted
Politicians, central banks, and the shape of financial supervision architectures
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8586.00164openalex-extracted
Monetary Policy Delegation, Contract Costs and Contract Targets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12340openalex-extracted
Errors have been made, others will be blamed: Issue engagement and blame shifting in prime minister speeches during the economic crisis in Europe
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12173openalex-extracted
Presidential Antagonism and Central Bank Credibility
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12304openalex-extracted
The myth of federal reserve de facto independence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2966.2007.00423.xopenalex-extracted
Fiscal leadership and central bank design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-6485.2005.00119.xopenalex-extracted
Independence Before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics and Central Bank Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1982.tb00350.xopenalex-extracted
INFLATION AND GOVERNMENT DEFICITS
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1538-4616.2010.00329.xopenalex-extracted
Optimal Monetary Policy in a Model with Agency Costs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.12606openalex-extracted
Optimal Structure of Fiscal and Monetary Authorities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.12772openalex-extracted
Political Pressure on Central Banks
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12606openalex-extracted
Central banks under stress: Reputation, accountability and regulatory coherence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12435openalex-extracted
The multi‐agencies dilemma of delegation: Why do policymakers choose one or multiple agencies for financial regulation?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12621openalex-extracted
Navigating financial cycles: Economic growth, bureaucratic autonomy, and regulatory governance in emerging markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12011openalex-extracted
Effective Monetary Policy Conservatism: A Comparison of 13 OECD Countries
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/0033553041382148openalex-extracted
Endogenous Political Institutions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/003355304772839515openalex-extracted
The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A Reinterpretation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/154247603322256765openalex-extracted
Incomplete Social Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/089533004773563449openalex-extracted
Constitutions and Economic Policy
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.1.60openalex-extracted
Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch, and Systemic Bailouts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.2.589openalex-extracted
Leverage and the Central Banker's Put
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.37.4.1661openalex-extracted
The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.40.3.837openalex-extracted
Modern Hyper- and High Inflations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.20.4.177openalex-extracted
How Richard Nixon Pressured Arthur Burns: Evidence from the Nixon Tapes
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.9.4.73openalex-extracted
The Mirage of Fixed Exchange Rates
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1353/mcb.2005.0048openalex-extracted
Are Two Heads Better Than One? Monetary Policy by Committee
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/ev-2021-0014openalex-extracted
The ECB Under the Threat of Fiscal Dominance – The Individual Central Banker Dimension
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1787/5k9fdwrnd1g3-enopenalex-extracted
Interactions Between Sovereign Debt Management and Monetary Policy Under Fiscal Dominance and Financial Instability
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.20955/r.105.223-33openalex-extracted
Fiscal Dominance and the Return of Zero-Interest Bank Reserve Requirements
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.21034/qr.531openalex-extracted
Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.21034/qr.712openalex-extracted
Higher Deficit Policies Lead to Higher Inflation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1112018openalex-extracted
Politicians and Financial Supervision Unification Outside the Central Bank: An Update of Theory and Evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1378882openalex-extracted
Financial Stability Frameworks and the Role of Central Banks
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2210413openalex-extracted
Monetary Policy and Fiscal Dominance in Italy from the Early 1970s to the Adoption of the Euro: A Review
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2475780openalex-extracted
Financial Stability, Monetary Policy, Banking Supervision, and Central Banking
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2599155openalex-extracted
Central Bankers as Supervisors: Do Crises Matter?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2799186openalex-extracted
Doves, Hawks and Pigeons: Behavioral Monetary Policy and Interest Rate Inertia
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3249940openalex-extracted
Interest Rate Rules Under Financial Dominance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3641817openalex-extracted
Central Bank Independence and Systemic Risk
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3723326openalex-extracted
Allocating Macro-Prudential Powers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4056620openalex-extracted
The Fiscal Dimension of Monetary Policy and Central Bank Autonomy: Lessons from Two Crises
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4092366openalex-extracted
Fiscal Regimes and the Exchange Rate
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4118082openalex-extracted
Exchange Rate and Inflation Under Weak Monetary Policy: Turkey Verifies Theory
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4991764openalex-extracted
Does Monetary Policy Influence Euro Area Fiscal Sustainability?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.879051openalex-extracted
Central Bank Governance: A Survey of Boards and Management
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.884829openalex-extracted
Fiscal Dominance, Debt, and Exchange Rates
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1344630openalex-extracted
Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/134971openalex-extracted
Inflationary Finance under Discretion and Rules
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1885679openalex-extracted
The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1909635openalex-extracted
Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2077796openalex-extracted
Is New Zealand's Reserve Bank Act of 1989 an Optimal Central Bank Contract?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2111050openalex-extracted
A Constitution for Solving Asymmetric Externality Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2235462openalex-extracted
Central Bank Independence and Monetary Control
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2953709openalex-extracted
Rogoff's "Conservative" Central Banker Restored
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w10019openalex-extracted
Inflation Targeting in Emerging Market Economies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w10389openalex-extracted
Fiscal Dominance and Inflation Targeting: Lessons from Brazil
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w15512openalex-extracted
Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles and Financial Crises, 1870-2008
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w16618openalex-extracted
Macroeconomics and Volatility: Data, Models, and Estimation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w17252openalex-extracted
Stories of the Twentieth Century for the Twenty-First
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w26308openalex-extracted
Threats to Central Bank Independence: High-Frequency Identification with Twitter
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w4353openalex-extracted
The Political Economy of Capital Controls
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w5856openalex-extracted
The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3917/ecofi.121.0111openalex-extracted
La politique macroprudentielle : un ouvrage en cours pour les banques centrales
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4159/harvard.9780674418950.c4openalex-extracted
3. Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4159/harvard.9780674434813.c5openalex-extracted
VI PREDICTABILITY: THE CRITERION OF MONETARY CONSTITUTIONS
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4337/9781035337576.00010openalex-extracted
Trends in central bank independence: a de jure perspective
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788973069.00026openalex-extracted
When central bankers become humans: behavioral economics and monetary policy decisions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5089/9781475561784.006openalex-extracted
Monetary Policy in the New Normal
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.55763/ippr.2020.01.02.001openalex-extracted
Fiscal Dominance - A Theory of Everything in India
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.48-0998openalex-extracted
Fault lines: how hidden fractures still threaten the world economy
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226724836.001.0001openalex-extracted
Reducing Inflation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2008.04.002openalex-snapshot
Politicians and financial supervision unification outside the central bank: Why do they do it?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2016.09.002openalex-snapshot
Doves, hawks and pigeons: Behavioral monetary policy and interest rate inertia
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grx053openalex-snapshot
Is Something Really Wrong with Macroeconomics?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1538-4616.2010.00334.xopenalex-snapshot
Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.155910openalex-snapshot
The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2591904openalex-snapshot
Ups and Downs. Central Bank Independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: Theory, Institutions and Empirics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2882547openalex-snapshot
The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A Reinterpretation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3191023openalex-snapshot
The Political Economy of Macroprudential Policy
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3235209openalex-snapshot
The Political Economy of Reforms in Central Bank Design: Evidence from a New Dataset
Editorial review for independent work. ICSAC — the Institute for Complexity
Science and Advanced Computing — runs a structured editorial panel for researchers
publishing outside journals, and publishes on CiteStamp rails. Submission is free
and goes through ORCID: icsacinstitute.org/submit.