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Optimal Competitive Ratio in Opaque Sales

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5130478
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

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Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
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Robust monopoly pricing
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Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions
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Convex Optimization
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Monopoly pricing with limited demand information
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Approximation Schemes for a Unit-Demand Buyer with Independent Items via Symmetries
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Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00638.xopenalex-snapshot
Robust Mechanism Design
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Pricing Randomized Allocations
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Algorithmic Price Discrimination
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On the Complexity of Optimal Lottery Pricing and Randomized Mechanisms for a Unit-Demand Buyer
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Information Design: A Unified Perspective
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/ijoc.2022.0275openalex-snapshot
Regret Minimization and Separation in Multi-Bidder Multi-Item Auctions
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Probabilistic Goods: A Creative Way of Selling Products and Services
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3750openalex-snapshot
The Power of Opaque Products in Pricing
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Optimal Auction Design
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Distribution-Free Pricing
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Screening with Limited Information: A Dual Perspective
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Optimal Selling Strategies: When to Haggle, When to Hold Firm
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Robustness and Separation in Multidimensional Screening
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Efficient Algorithms for Adversarial Contextual Learning
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Revenue Maximization with Imprecise Distribution
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