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Mechanism Design for Exchange Markets

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5142104
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44676-1_35openalex-snapshot
Competitive Auctions for Multiple Digital Goods
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18283-9_20openalex-snapshot
ABSNFT: Securitization and Repurchase Scheme for Non-Fungible Tokens Based on Game Theoretical Analysis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3_1openalex-snapshot
Liquid Price of Anarchy
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3_4openalex-snapshot
Liquid Welfare Maximization in Auctions with Multiple Items
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-43948-7_33openalex-snapshot
Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01726210openalex-snapshot
Multipart pricing of public goods
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.001openalex-snapshot
A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.003openalex-snapshot
Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.02.009openalex-snapshot
Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/focs.2014.36openalex-snapshot
Mechanism Design for Crowdsourcing: An Optimal 1-1/e Competitive Budget-Feasible Mechanism for Large Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.xopenalex-snapshot
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/1250790.1250844openalex-snapshot
Proportional response dynamics leads to market equilibrium
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/1811099.1811064openalex-snapshot
Incentivizing peer-assisted services
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/1993574.1993609openalex-snapshot
Single valued combinatorial auctions with budgets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2492002.2482554openalex-snapshot
Prior-free auctions for budgeted agents
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2509002.2509005openalex-snapshot
Matching "versus" mechanism design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2591796.2591855openalex-snapshot
Optimal competitive auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2600057.2602851openalex-snapshot
Clinching auctions beyond hard budget constraints
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2745844.2745860openalex-snapshot
Exchange of Services in Networks
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2764468.2764500openalex-snapshot
Improved Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2764468.2764521openalex-snapshot
Revenue Maximization and Ex-Post Budget Constraints
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3274647openalex-snapshot
Revenue Maximization and Ex-Post Budget Constraints
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3406325.3451076openalex-snapshot
Efficient Two-Sided Markets with Limited Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597772openalex-snapshot
Liquid Welfare Guarantees for No-Regret Learning in Sequential Budgeted Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/509907.509920openalex-snapshot
On the complexity of equilibria
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2021.1124openalex-snapshot
Polyhedral Clinching Auctions for Two-Sided Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2023.0274openalex-snapshot
Liquid Welfare Guarantees for No-Regret Learning in Sequential Budgeted Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58openalex-snapshot
Optimal Auction Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011949openalex-snapshot
A Bridge between Liquid and Social Welfare in Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Bidders
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.5100openalex-snapshot
Efficient Mechanism Design for Online Scheduling
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1907515openalex-snapshot
On the Stability of the Competitive Equilibrium, I
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1907779openalex-snapshot
On the Stability of the Competitive Equilibrium, II
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1914085openalex-snapshot
Incentives in Teams
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2224491openalex-snapshot
The Economics of Welfare
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2802221openalex-snapshot
Barter and Economic Disintegration
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3406/hom.1980.368100openalex-snapshot
Barter as a Universal Mode of Exchange
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4230/lipics.esa.2026.84openalex-snapshot
Mechanism Design without Money via Stable Matching
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2407.04898openalex-snapshot
Nash Incentive-compatible Online Mechanism Learning via Weakly Differentially Private Online Learning
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