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Consumer Information in Credence-Good Market *

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5161507
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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.03.002openalex-snapshot
Equilibrium information in credence goods
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102694openalex-snapshot
The information paradox in a monopolist’s credence goods market
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2011.06.004openalex-snapshot
Consumer information in a market for expert services
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105722openalex-snapshot
Information Design for Selling Search Goods and the Effect of Competition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102519openalex-snapshot
Competitive equilibrium fraud in markets for credence-goods
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261975openalex-snapshot
The Economics of Breakdowns, Checkups, and Cures
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/466756openalex-snapshot
Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/720984openalex-snapshot
Attraction versus Persuasion: Information Provision in Search Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12348openalex-snapshot
Robust pricing with refunds
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12411openalex-snapshot
Consumer search and optimal information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00186.xopenalex-snapshot
Endogenous market segmentation for lemons
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/000282806776157632openalex-snapshot
Advertising Content
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/002205106776162717openalex-snapshot
On Doctors, Mechanics, and Computer Specialists: The Economics of Credence Goods
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.6.2590openalex-snapshot
Bayesian Persuasion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20160145openalex-snapshot
Buyer-Optimal Learning and Monopoly Pricing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20210083openalex-snapshot
Consumer Information and the Limits to Competition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/pandp.20191101openalex-snapshot
Optimal Information Design for Search Goods
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1912769openalex-snapshot
Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555942openalex-snapshot
Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555964openalex-snapshot
Competition in a Market for Informed Experts' Services
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta9278openalex-snapshot
Waiting for News in the Market for Lemons
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