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Matching, Unanticipated Experiences, Divorce, Flirting, Rematching, Etc.
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0666openalex-snapshot
Unawareness and Partitional Information Structures
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2512openalex-snapshot
Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility, and the Core
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-6337-2_4openalex-snapshot
Conjectural Equilibria and Rationalizability in a Game with Incomplete Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01044377openalex-snapshot
When every relationship is above average: Perceptions and expectations of divorce at the time of marriage.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00148-006-0084-9openalex-snapshot
Do children stabilize relationships in Denmark?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0037-2openalex-snapshot
Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0519-1openalex-snapshot
Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-018-1108-6openalex-snapshot
Random path to stability in a decentralized market with contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10869-016-9438-9openalex-snapshot
How Today’s Shocks Predict Tomorrow’s Leaving
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0004-3702(87)90003-8openalex-snapshot
Belief, awareness, and limited reasoning
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(92)90078-vopenalex-snapshot
Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(89)90018-3openalex-snapshot
Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.002openalex-snapshot
Paths to stability for matching markets with couples
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.07.003openalex-snapshot
A canonical model for interactive unawareness
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.003openalex-snapshot
Disclosure of information in matching markets with non-transferable utility
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.01.008openalex-snapshot
On the non-existence of stable matches with incomplete information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.007openalex-snapshot
Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.10.001openalex-snapshot
Information structures with unawareness
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.07.006openalex-snapshot
Stochastic stability for roommate markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.11.001openalex-snapshot
Stable marriages and search frictions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.09.005openalex-snapshot
A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.01.004openalex-snapshot
Stability with one-sided incomplete information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105365openalex-snapshot
Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.07.004openalex-snapshot
The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignment game
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00085-1openalex-snapshot
A search model of two-sided matching under nontransferable utility
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(02)00073-3openalex-snapshot
Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/00029890.1962.11989827openalex-snapshot
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/10502556.2013.773792openalex-snapshot
Breaking Up, Breaking Hearts? Characteristics of the Divorce Process and Well-Being After Divorce
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198717959.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Transformative Experience
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2005.01642.xopenalex-snapshot
Time Does Not Heal All Wounds
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00517.xopenalex-snapshot
The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198913400094openalex-snapshot
COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: SOME OPEN PROBLEMS
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20181186openalex-snapshot
Stability and Bayesian Consistency in Two-Sided Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/stsc.2021.0126openalex-snapshot
Value Capture in the Face of Known and Unknown Unknowns
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555625openalex-snapshot
Relying on the Information of Interested Parties
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2938326openalex-snapshot
Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/351591openalex-snapshot
Remarriage after Divorce: A Longitudinal Analysis of Well-Being
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta11183openalex-snapshot
Stable Matching With Incomplete Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te3867openalex-snapshot
Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning
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