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Learning Safe Strategies for Value Maximizing Buyers in Uniform Price Auctions
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What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35389-6_2openalex-snapshot
Autobidding with Constraints
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53354-3_19openalex-snapshot
Truthfulness and Approximation with Value-Maximizing Bidders
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050220openalex-snapshot
Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-014-9537-9openalex-snapshot
Uniform Price Auctions: Equilibria and Efficiency
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511546921openalex-snapshot
Prediction, Learning, and Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdu023openalex-snapshot
Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00002.xopenalex-snapshot
Designing electricity auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611976465.68openalex-snapshot
Beating Greedy For Approximating Reserve Prices in Multi-Unit VCG Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/1566374.1566407openalex-snapshot
Simple versus optimal mechanisms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3442381.3449841openalex-snapshot
Auction Design for ROI-Constrained Buyers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3442381.3450052openalex-snapshot
Towards Efficient Auctions in an Auto-bidding World
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3465456.3467607openalex-snapshot
The Landscape of Auto-Bidding Auctions: Value Versus Utility Maximization
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3543507.3583491openalex-snapshot
Online Bidding Algorithms for Return-on-Spend Constrained Advertisers✱
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597772openalex-snapshot
Liquid Welfare Guarantees for No-Regret Learning in Sequential Budgeted Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3589334.3645660openalex-snapshot
Individual Welfare Guarantees in the Autobidding World with Machine-learned Advice
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3630749openalex-snapshot
Optimal Auctions through Deep Learning: Advances in Differentiable Economics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3670865.3673454openalex-snapshot
GemNet: Menu-Based, Strategy-Proof Multi-Bidder Auctions Through Deep Learning
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3696410.3714881openalex-snapshot
No-Regret Algorithms in non-Truthful Auctions with Budget and ROI Constraints
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3699824.3699838openalex-snapshot
Auto-Bidding and Auctions in Online Advertising: A Survey
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/ijoc.15.3.284.16077openalex-snapshot
Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3897openalex-snapshot
Linear Program-Based Approximation for Personalized Reserve Prices
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4899openalex-snapshot
Robust Bidding in First-Price Auctions: How to Bid Without Knowing What Others Are Doing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2020.1991openalex-snapshot
Dynamic Incentive-Aware Learning: Robust Pricing in Contextual Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2021.2121openalex-snapshot
Improved Revenue Bounds for Posted-Price and Second-Price Mechanisms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta8365openalex-snapshot
Valuing Dealers' Informational Advantage: A Study of Canadian Treasury Auctions
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/3820171.3806860openalex-snapshot
Nash Equilibria in Uniform Price Auctions: Theory, Computation, and Market Insights
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