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Peer Information in Mechanism Design without Transfers

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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.06.002openalex-snapshot
Delegation and Nonmonetary Incentives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105687openalex-snapshot
Selecting a winner with external referees
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2024.105934openalex-snapshot
Cross-verification and persuasive cheap talk
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00003-9openalex-snapshot
Eliciting information from multiple experts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/710560openalex-snapshot
Commitment versus Flexibility with Costly Verification
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/721618openalex-snapshot
Costless Information and Costly Verification: A Case for Transparency
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/722089openalex-snapshot
Informationally Simple Incentives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00336openalex-snapshot
Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12083openalex-snapshot
PARETO EFFICIENCY AND WEIGHTED MAJORITY RULES
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3328526.3329657openalex-snapshot
Probabilistic Verification in Mechanism Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3391403.3399536openalex-snapshot
Allocation with Correlated Information: Too Good to Be True
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3490486.3538317openalex-snapshot
Mechanisms without Transfers for Fully Biased Agents
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.12.3779openalex-snapshot
Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.91.5.1478openalex-snapshot
Conflicts and Common Interests in Committees
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2513296openalex-snapshot
Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.25740/hv544mx1284openalex-snapshot
Optimal Decision Mechanisms for Committees: Acquitting the Guilty
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta10592openalex-snapshot
On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta14991openalex-snapshot
Mechanisms With Evidence: Commitment and Robustness
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te1808openalex-snapshot
Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te3101openalex-snapshot
Costly verification in collective decisions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te4541openalex-snapshot
Unrestricted information acquisition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te5088openalex-snapshot
Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te5578openalex-snapshot
Information transmission in persuasion models with imperfect verification
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2205.10910openalex-snapshot
Mechanisms without transfers for fully biased agents
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2410.08954openalex-snapshot
Optimal Allocation with Peer Information
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