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FROM SUPERMODULAR TO SUBMODULAR: TRANSITION IN A STOPPING TIME GAME WITH LEARNING

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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0061openalex-snapshot

Continuous Stochastic Games of Capital Accumulation with Convex Transitions

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0062openalex-snapshot

Cournot Oligopoly and the Theory of Supermodular Games

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0101openalex-snapshot

Markov Equilibria of Stochastic Games with Complementarities

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01210269openalex-snapshot

A theory of stopping time games with applications to product innovations and asset sales

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01198-4openalex-snapshot

Super- and submodularity of stopping games with random observations

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10440-018-0212-zopenalex-snapshot

Optimal Stopping Problems in Lévy Models with Random Observations

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(90)90005-topenalex-snapshot

Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(94)00710-1openalex-snapshot

Sensitivity analysis of multisector optimal economic dynamics

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.10.004openalex-snapshot

Mixed equilibria are unstable in games of strategic complements

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.02.001openalex-snapshot

Continuous-time games of timing

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.09.005openalex-snapshot

A constructive study of Markov equilibria in stochastic games with strategic complementarities

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105232openalex-snapshot

Strategic observation with exponential bandits

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105523openalex-snapshot

Strategic investment and learning with private information

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00122-2openalex-snapshot

Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00564.xopenalex-snapshot

Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1137/18m119803xopenalex-snapshot

Nonzero-Sum Games of Optimal Stopping and Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te595openalex-snapshot

Strategic experimentation with Poisson bandits

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