On the public citation graph
Verifiable Private Disclosure in Auctions
0 signed · 35 inferred · view as graph
Inferred edges come from two machine sources: sweeps of open repository metadata (mostly SSRN and Zenodo), and a bulk OpenAlex citation snapshot. Every row below is labelled with the one it came from. Neither is a complete citation index — absence here is not evidence of absence.
Is this your work? Sign in with ORCID and put your name on the
claims that are yours.
Reference health. See whether every reference in this work resolves to a
known work and none has been retracted — and get a dated CiteStamped
badge you can embed.
What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0374-xopenalex-snapshot
Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners’ dilemma
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0177-4openalex-snapshot
Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(87)90113-xopenalex-snapshot
Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(90)90197-9openalex-snapshot
Equilibrium bid functions for auctions with an uncertain number of bidders
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.12.006openalex-snapshot
Information disclosure to Cournot duopolists
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109615openalex-snapshot
Voluntary information disclosure to Cournot oligopolists
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.08.003openalex-snapshot
Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.03.008openalex-snapshot
Knowing your opponents: Information disclosure and auction design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.11.007openalex-snapshot
Auctions with uncertain numbers of bidders
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.02.001openalex-snapshot
Information structures in optimal auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.12.002openalex-snapshot
Full revelation of information in Sender–Receiver games of persuasion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105020openalex-snapshot
Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105705openalex-snapshot
Private disclosure with multiple agents
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/466995openalex-snapshot
The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00056openalex-snapshot
On the Failure of the Linkage Principle in Multi-unit Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12342openalex-snapshot
Not knowing the competition: evidence and implications for auction design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2007.00442.xopenalex-snapshot
Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/003355302753399481openalex-snapshot
Monotone Comparative Statics under Uncertainty
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20210504openalex-snapshot
Optimal Information Disclosure in Classic Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.22.2.115openalex-snapshot
What the Seller Won't Tell You: Persuasion and Disclosure in Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3907563openalex-snapshot
Winner's Curse and Entry in Highway Procurement
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1593709openalex-snapshot
Ignorance Promotes Competition: An Auction Model with Endogenous Private Valuations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1913603openalex-snapshot
Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2171817openalex-snapshot
Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2490910openalex-snapshot
Disclosure of Nonproprietary Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555625openalex-snapshot
Relying on the Information of Interested Parties
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555693openalex-snapshot
Resolving Uncertainty about the Number of Bidders in Independent Private- Value Auctions: An Experimental Analysis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3003562openalex-snapshot
Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta11070openalex-snapshot
Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta9859openalex-snapshot
A Mechanism Design Approach to Ranking Asymmetric Auctions
Editorial review for independent work. ICSAC — the Institute for Complexity
Science and Advanced Computing — runs a structured editorial panel for researchers
publishing outside journals, and publishes on CiteStamp rails. Submission is free
and goes through ORCID: icsacinstitute.org/submit.