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Subsidizing Participation
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1995.2452openalex-snapshot
Coordination in Auctions with Entry
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01053238openalex-snapshot
The solution to the Tullock rent-seeking game when R>2: Mixed-strategy equilibria and mean dissipation rates
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0435-9openalex-snapshot
Contests with endogenous entry
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-019-00690-4openalex-snapshot
Downstream competition and upstream labor market matching
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0301-0openalex-snapshot
Auctions with costly information acquisition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0331-2openalex-snapshot
Auction design with opportunity cost
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0835-xopenalex-snapshot
Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0915-6openalex-snapshot
Second-price auctions with sequential and costly participation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-1028-6openalex-snapshot
Equilibria in second-price auctions with private participation costs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(84)90138-1openalex-snapshot
Participation constraints in the vickrey auction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.11.006openalex-snapshot
Equilibria in first price auctions with participation costs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.015openalex-snapshot
Optimal auctions with information acquisition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.06.009openalex-snapshot
Resale in second-price auctions with costly participation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2019.04.005openalex-snapshot
The optimal allocation of prizes in contests with costly entry
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.02.008openalex-snapshot
Equilibria in second price auctions with participation costs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105000openalex-snapshot
Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.01.006openalex-snapshot
On Disclosure Policies in All-pay Auctions with Stochastic Entry
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.12.005openalex-snapshot
Are bid preferences benign? The effect of small business subsidies in highway procurement auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.06.004openalex-snapshot
Intuitive and noncompetitive equilibria in weakly efficient auctions with entry costs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00114-5openalex-snapshot
Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511813825openalex-snapshot
Putting Auction Theory to Work
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261409openalex-snapshot
Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261786openalex-snapshot
Entry and Competition in Concentrated Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/710560openalex-snapshot
Commitment versus Flexibility with Costly Verification
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/721618openalex-snapshot
Costless Information and Costly Verification: A Case for Transparency
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00096openalex-snapshot
Information Acquisition in Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12393openalex-snapshot
Divide and Conquer in Two-Sided Markets: A Potential-Game Approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12402openalex-snapshot
Information disclosure in dynamic research contests
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00135.xopenalex-snapshot
CONTEST DESIGN AND OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS ENTRY
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00037.xopenalex-snapshot
Competition in two-sided markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12004openalex-snapshot
Second‐Price Auctions with Different Participation Costs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12311openalex-snapshot
Managing competition on a two‐sided platform
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.12734openalex-snapshot
Making The Best Idea Better: The Role of Idea Pool Structure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.13659openalex-snapshot
Designing Internal Innovation Contests
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/003355399556016openalex-snapshot
Contracting with Externalities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828041464434openalex-snapshot
Incentives and Discrimination
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.12.3779openalex-snapshot
Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20140494openalex-snapshot
Optimal Allocation with Ex Post Verification and Limited Penalties
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20190234openalex-snapshot
Raising Capital from Heterogeneous Investors
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20200555openalex-snapshot
Rank Uncertainty in Organizations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20221247openalex-snapshot
Optimal Insurance: Dual Utility, Random Losses, and Adverse Selection
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.4.1544openalex-snapshot
Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.5.1.1openalex-snapshot
Set-Asides and Subsidies in Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.20.2.170.10193openalex-snapshot
Designing Optimal Sales Contests: A Theoretical Perspective
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1080.0884openalex-snapshot
Innovation Contests, Open Innovation, and Multiagent Problem Solving
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2738openalex-snapshot
Incentives in Contests with Heterogeneous Solvers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2955openalex-snapshot
Sourcing Innovation: On Feedback in Contests
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.02894openalex-snapshot
Network Externalities and Market Dominance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4792openalex-snapshot
Quality Strategies in Network Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.49.1.71.12748openalex-snapshot
Is Subsidizing Inefficient Bidders Actually Costly?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2016.1575openalex-snapshot
Optimal Award Scheme in Innovation Tournaments
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2020.0754openalex-snapshot
Quality Selection in Two-Sided Markets: A Constrained Price Discrimination Approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2764458openalex-snapshot
Mechanism Design with Costly Verification and Limited Punishments
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3780434openalex-snapshot
Weight-Ranked Divide-and-Conquer Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4174410openalex-snapshot
Optimal Insurance: Dual Utility, Random Losses and Adverse Selection
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4741349openalex-snapshot
Competitive bottlenecks and platform spillovers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4969462openalex-snapshot
Symmetric Equilibrium in Pre-Auction Investment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te3101openalex-snapshot
Costly verification in collective decisions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2409.02031openalex-snapshot
Optimal allocations with capacity constrained verification
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