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Voluntary Disclosure and Beauty Contests

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5383043
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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-021-09601-zopenalex-snapshot
Voluntary disclosure when private information and disclosure costs are jointly determined
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(83)90011-3openalex-snapshot
Discretionary disclosure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(90)90020-5openalex-snapshot
Voluntary disclosure with a strategic opponent
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(90)90048-9openalex-snapshot
Financial disclosure policy in an entry game
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2006.10.002openalex-snapshot
Voluntary disclosure of information when firms are uncertain of investor response
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2007.03.001openalex-snapshot
Voluntary disclosure under uncertainty about the reporting objective
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.08.012openalex-snapshot
Silence is safest: Information disclosure when the audience’s preferences are uncertain
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1017931630916openalex-snapshot
The Interpretation of Information and Corporate Disclosure Strategies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2022.2109706openalex-snapshot
Higher-Order Beliefs, Market-Based Incentives, and Information Quality
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhj036openalex-snapshot
Beauty Contests and Iterated Expectations in Asset Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00391openalex-snapshot
Disclosures and Asset Returns
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00783.xopenalex-snapshot
Efficient Use of Information and Social�Value�of�Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-679x.2008.00295.xopenalex-snapshot
Keynesian Beauty Contest, Accounting Disclosure, and Market Efficiency
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828041301641openalex-snapshot
Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.938516openalex-snapshot
Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2490910openalex-snapshot
Disclosure of Nonproprietary Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2491118openalex-snapshot
Disclosure When the Market Is Unsure of Information Endowment of Managers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2021-0232openalex-snapshot
Harmonized Accounting Standards and Investment Beauty Contests
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