On the public citation graph

A Dominant Strategy Lottery with Full Participation and Value Proportional Allocation

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5538170
0 signed · 16 inferred · view as graph

Inferred edges come from two machine sources: sweeps of open repository metadata (mostly SSRN and Zenodo), and a bulk OpenAlex citation snapshot. Every row below is labelled with the one it came from. Neither is a complete citation index — absence here is not evidence of absence.

Is this your work? Sign in with ORCID and put your name on the claims that are yours.
Claim with ORCID
Reference health. See whether every reference in this work resolves to a known work and none has been retracted — and get a dated CiteStamped badge you can embed.
See reference health

What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0605-2openalex-snapshot
Population uncertainty in contests
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0622-xopenalex-snapshot
Endogenous contest success functions: a mechanism design approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0688-5openalex-snapshot
Incomplete information in rent-seeking contests
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01209-4openalex-snapshot
Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-007-9255-9openalex-snapshot
Rent-seeking contests with incomplete information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.08.019openalex-snapshot
Unique equilibrium in rent-seeking contests with a continuum of types
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.10.008openalex-snapshot
Quality contests
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511813825openalex-snapshot
Putting Auction Theory to Work
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1018391504741openalex-snapshot
Rent-seeking with asymmetric valuations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1019915126367openalex-snapshot
Lottery Versus All-Pay Auction Models of Lobbying
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1020877410243openalex-snapshot
Asymmetric Rent-Seeking with More than Two Contestants
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1023/b:puch.0000024166.63342.09openalex-snapshot
Sent Seeking With Private Values
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1989.tb00003.xopenalex-snapshot
POLITICALLY CONTESTABLE RENTS AND TRANSFERS*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2482540.2482582openalex-snapshot
Mechanism design for fair division
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58openalex-snapshot
Optimal Auction Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911954openalex-snapshot
Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
Editorial review for independent work. ICSAC — the Institute for Complexity Science and Advanced Computing — runs a structured editorial panel for researchers publishing outside journals, and publishes on CiteStamp rails. Submission is free and goes through ORCID: icsacinstitute.org/submit.