On the public citation graph
Competition between Asset Managers over Relative Performance Fees
0 signed · 21 inferred · view as graph
Inferred edges come from two machine sources: sweeps of open repository metadata (mostly SSRN and Zenodo), and a bulk OpenAlex citation snapshot. Every row below is labelled with the one it came from. Neither is a complete citation index — absence here is not evidence of absence.
Is this your work? Sign in with ORCID and put your name on the
claims that are yours.
Reference health. See whether every reference in this work resolves to a
known work and none has been retracted — and get a dated CiteStamped
badge you can embed.
What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00780-015-0266-yopenalex-snapshot
Hedge and mutual funds’ fees and the separation of private investments
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-023-02221-4openalex-snapshot
Fund Managers’ Competition for Investment Flows Based on Relative Performance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11579-019-00255-9openalex-snapshot
Many-player games of optimal consumption and investment under relative performance criteria
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2007.12.018openalex-snapshot
Offsetting the implicit incentives: Benefits of benchmarking in money management
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2024.105003openalex-snapshot
Optimal investment-withdrawal strategy for variable annuities under a performance fee structure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.05.004openalex-snapshot
The economics of hedge funds
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9965.1993.tb00044.xopenalex-snapshot
OPTIMAL INVESTMENT STRATEGIES FOR CONTROLLING DRAWDOWNS
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb02675.xopenalex-snapshot
An Exact Solution to a Dynamic Portfolio Choice Problem under Transactions Costs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb05203.xopenalex-snapshot
Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01427.xopenalex-snapshot
High‐Water Marks: High Risk Appetites? Convex Compensation, Long Horizons, and Portfolio Choice
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12167openalex-snapshot
Incentives and Endogenous Risk Taking: A Structural View on Hedge Fund Alphas
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/mafi.12034openalex-snapshot
OPTIMAL INVESTMENT UNDER RELATIVE PERFORMANCE CONCERNS
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/mafi.12057openalex-snapshot
THE INCENTIVES OF HEDGE FUND FEES AND HIGH‐WATER MARKS
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/mafi.12206openalex-snapshot
Mean field and n‐agent games for optimal investment under relative performance criteria
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1137/100790884openalex-snapshot
Optimal Investment with High-watermark Performance Fee
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1137/140983859openalex-snapshot
Optimal Investment with Transaction Costs and Stochastic Volatility Part I: Infinite Horizon
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1137/18m1205066openalex-snapshot
Optimal Investment with High-Watermark Fee in a Multidimensional Jump Diffusion Model
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1137/20m1376169openalex-snapshot
Competition in Fund Management and Forward Relative Performance Criteria
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1137/20m138421xopenalex-snapshot
Forward Utility and Market Adjustments in Relative Investment-Consumption Games of Many Players
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1137/21m1401826openalex-snapshot
Performance Fees with Stochastic Benchmark
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.35.7.807openalex-snapshot
Adverse Risk Incentives and the Design of Performance-Based Contracts
Editorial review for independent work. ICSAC — the Institute for Complexity
Science and Advanced Computing — runs a structured editorial panel for researchers
publishing outside journals, and publishes on CiteStamp rails. Submission is free
and goes through ORCID: icsacinstitute.org/submit.