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Locating two (noxious) public facilities on two adjacent streets

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.6269363
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1993.1069openalex-snapshot
Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00128122openalex-snapshot
On strategy-proofness and single peakedness
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0396-4openalex-snapshot
Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0562-xopenalex-snapshot
Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0785-8openalex-snapshot
On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0624-4openalex-snapshot
Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-006-0018-8openalex-snapshot
Optimal mechanisms for siting noxious facilities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(75)90050-2openalex-snapshot
Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2006.03.008openalex-snapshot
Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.02.003openalex-snapshot
Group strategy-proofness and voting between two alternatives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.07.001openalex-snapshot
Strategy-proof location of public bads in a two-country model
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/256963openalex-snapshot
A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1914083openalex-snapshot
Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2296962openalex-snapshot
Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2938220openalex-snapshot
Voting by Committees
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