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Negative Vote Eliminates Strategic Voting

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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1002/bs.3830340105openalex-snapshot

On combining approval with disapproval voting

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7openalex-snapshot

Handbook on Approval Voting

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(75)90050-2openalex-snapshot

Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139174954openalex-snapshot

Making Votes Count

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/0025570x.1983.11977044openalex-snapshot

Paradoxes of Preferential Voting

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1914083openalex-snapshot

Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2938959openalex-snapshot

A Theory of Voting Equilibria

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